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ABSTRACT

A discussion of the 1988 conference of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) along with a report on the meaning of the IPSA for the Dutch National Institute for Curriculum Development (SLO) are presented in this document. Part 1 includes: general information on the aims, structure, and activities of the IPSA; a description of the 14th World Congress with its special themes and concerns; and a section on the mutual interests of SLO and IPSA. Six selected papers presented at the World Congress comprise part 2: "Trends of the Current West German Educational Policy" (Heike Ackermann); "Curriculum Development in Political Education, Particularly the International Dimension" (Hans Hooghoff); "Modernity and Tradition: Dilemmas of Political Education in Developing Countries" (Suna Kili); "The De-Legitimation of Political Education in Britain: A Working Paper" (Lynton Robins); "The Spiral of De-Legitimation of Power in Poland" (Teresa Sasinska-Klas); and "The Concepts of Politics: The Schizophrenia between Political Education and Political Reality in Hungary" (Mate Szabo). Twelve selected abstracts of additional conference papers are presented in the third and last part of the volume. (DB)

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Editors:
Michael van der Dussen
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The Netherlands

Towards a global political science

A report on the 14th World Congres of the Political Science Association Washington, 1988 with Comments, Some Selected Papers and Abstracts

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SLO, Enschede, The Netherlands, 1989

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Preface

The active participation in conferences calls for the dissemination of collected information to colleagues. The growing interest in political and social education in Europe provides the rationale for a publication on the activities of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). Because many abstracts of the last conference in 1988 were available together with a number of full papers the idea came up to give an impression of the IPSA 1988 conference together with a report on the meaning of IPSA for the Dutch National Institute for Curriculum Development (SLO). In that way a wider audience can be informed about IPSA activities in connection with the issue of political education.
Within the constraints of a short publication a choice was made for a number of full papers and abstracts. The rapid changes of the political map in Eastern Europe may add to the historic perspective of some of the articles. In this case full papers from Europe were favoured above others.

The volume opens with general information on aims, structure and activities of IPSA. The 14th World Congress with its special themes and concerns is the subject of the next section.
Then mutual interests of SLO and IPSA are formulated under the heading of the concept of political education. It may be clear that in this section the possibility future development of political education is the common concern. For the information in these sections ample use has been made of the official brochures and other documents published by IPSA.
Selected papers and abstracts in the second and third part of the book offer an opportunity to readers to share individual thoughts of contributors to the 14th World Congress of IPSA.

Part I IPSA

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1. IPSA

1.1. Aims and Structure

The International Political Science Association (IPSA) is an international, voluntary, non-profit organization, founded under the auspices of UNESCO in 1949. It now has 39 national and regional Collective Members (national and regional associations) representing every region and continent in the world.
Its objectives are to promote the advancement of political science throughout the world through: the establishement of national associations; organizing world congresses and round tables; providing documentary and reference services; and facilitating the dissemination of information on developments in the field of Political Science. Through its activities the IPSA seeks to promote research and to develop contacts between political scientists of various regions and political systems of the world.
The IPSA has consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with UNESCO. Its legal seat is in Paris, France at the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. Its secretariat is located with the Secretary-General - currently at the University of Oslo, Norway.

Memberschip in the International Political Science Association falls into three categories.

1. Collective members
   Consists of national and regional associations (regional refers to a group of countries in the same geographical area recognized by the Executive Committee of the IPSA as being representative of political science in their respective countries (or regions). Normally, there is only one Collective Member representing a particular country.
   To qualify as a Collective Member, a national (regional) political science association must include most of the specialists who deal with political science in that country (region). Examples of the about 40 Collective Members are the associations in the following countries of world regions: United Kingdom, Poland, China, U.S.S.R., Brazil, U.S.A., Africa, The Netherlands, the Asian-Pacific region.
2. Associate membership
   Open to: associations, organizations, societies and institutions pursuing objectives compatible with those of the IPSA in related fields of activity. Especially of interest to libraries and research institutes. Associate members receive all kind of information at reduced prices.
3. Individual membership
   Open to: persons suitably qualified by their professional activity of general interest in political science and desiring to further objectives of the Association. Benefits: the opportunity to

participate in IPSA meetings and committees, and special reduction to several journals.

Organization and structure are marked by activities every three years at the time of the World Congress. The Collective Members nominate members to the Associations' Council. The Council, in turn, elects a president and an Executive Committee. The Executive Committee names a Secretary-General, approves Research Committees, Study Groups, round tables and the program of the World Congress.
The President selects and chairs the Programm Committee for the World Congress. With the Secretary-General he directs the day-to-day operations of the Association.
Members from the Executive Committee 1985-1988 came from 17 countries and regions. Secretary General for the next period is Francesco Kjellberg, Oslo, Norway.

1.2. Activities

The Association currently undertakes the following activities:
- organizes a World Congress every three years;
- collaborates in interdisciplinary work with other international associations;
- promotes the growth and improvement of the discipline of political science throughout the world;
- sponsors 27 Research Committees and 18 Study Groups;
- holds several research seminars and round tables annually;
- publishes International Political Science Review (official journal of the IPSA);
- publishes International Political Science Abstracts;
- publishes a newsletter, Participation;
- publishes Advances in Political Science: An International Series.

Research Committees bring together scholars who wish to pursue comparative research on a transnational basis. Coming from a number of countries, they form together over a period of years to pursue the development of theory and research on specific topics. Officially recognized by the IPSA, the Committees hold round tables on a regular basis, sponsor sessions at the triennial World Congress and promote communication and contact between their network of scholars.
For example: The Research Committee on Political Education, Chairman Professor Bernhard Claussen, Hamburg.
Some issues taken from the 29 Committees are:
Political Elites; Socio-Political Problems of Pluralism; The Emerging International Economic Order; Political Education; Global Communication, etc.

Study Groups are newer groupings of scholars from several countries concentrating on a particular topic of study and research. The IPSA encourages their activities with the possibility that these groups may become Research Committees in the future. They currently include: Technology and Development; Comparative Sociology and Political Science; Religion and Politics; Public Bureaucracies in Developing Societies, etc.

Publications are devoted to the creation or dissemination of rigorous political inquiry free of any subdisciplinary or other orthodoxy. In quarterly guest-edited theme issues, the IPSA official journal covers controversial topics of current concern to the international community

of political scientists and new developments at the forefront of political inquiry.

The Advances in Political Science series of books reflects the aims and intellectual traditions of the International Political Science Association: the generation and dissemination of political inquiry free of any subdisciplinary or other orthodoxy. This series seeks to present the best work being done today

1. on the central and critical controversial themes of politics and/or
2. in new areas of inquiry where political scientists, alone or in conjunction with other scholars, are shaping innovative concepts and methodologies of political analysis.

2. The 14th World Congres

Washington, D.C., U.S.A., August 28th - September 1st, 1988

2.1. Theme: Toward a Global Political Science

The Fourteenth World Congress of the International Political Science Association was held in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., from 28th August to 1st September 1988.
The theme of the Congress was 'Toward a Global Political Science'.

The 1988 IPSA President Kinhide Mushakoji (Japan) stated a few years ago (1985) that the present period is a time of unprecedented and important opportunities for Political Science. These opportunities include the contribution to better policy and thus to a better world. But to make this contribution Political Science will need to be enriched and strengthened. The enrichment and strenghtening of the discipline can be favoured by making Political Science global. The 14th Congress of IPSA was devoted to this task.

Mushakoji (1985) outlined three principles that he regarded as essential for Political Science to make its potential contribution:

1. There should be a combination of a universal commitment to norms of scientific inquiries, including openness about one's own data base and paradigmatic option, and on this basis an acceptance of pluralism in terms of all dimensions of one's own paradigm, i.e. in terms of preference or research objects, conceptual frameworks, methodologies and criteria of relevance.
2. This implies especially a pluralism which does not reject innovative approaches opening possible paradigm shifts while respecting the cumulative results of the efforts of the profession which works as a community of researchers accepting certain paradigms as a common heritage.
3. This implies also a pluralism where certain researchers are left to themselves untouched by the impacts of funding agencies and professional bodies, others freely form teams for collaborative research irrespective of funding source's interests. Still others will collaborate with institutions on the basis of shared values, concerns, and research interests.

In his analysis of the theme of the Congress Harold Jacobson (1988), Program Chair of the Congress, argues that the task of making Political Science global can only be understood in the context of the history of the development of the discipline. The exploration of this evolving theory was indeed an important aspect of the Congress.
Following Jacobson's analysis it can be said that with the exception of a few examples in history the modern discipline of Political Science came into being in the early years of the twentieth century in a small number of countries, e.g. the U.S.A.
Several countries continue to use the plural concept based on the early French concept of plural Political Sciences, contradictory to the Anglo-Saxon concept of singular Political Science.

In the 1950s and 1960s Political Science gradually developed in Western Europe. Political Science departments were established widely throughout Africa, Asia, and South and Central America.

The discipline as it has been developed is a practical one with a strong normative orientation. The discipline is expected to give relevant answers to significant and immediate problems.
Because of the double role of Political Science being a critic and the supporter of governments the relationship between Political Science and governments is ambivalent. This is specifically the case when the meaning of citizenship education is discussed: Political Science is always an important component of this education (see also Part 1, 3). This education can take directions that governments may find objectionable and attempt to resist.

In the 1950s the behavioural persuasion caused a switch in the attention from institutions to informal structures and processes. Other dimensions have been added to Political Science during the last two decades. Outside the countries of origin political scientists in other parts of the world have focused their attention on issues of local concern with concepts and methodologies more appropriate for their situation.
The examination of political processes including economic variables in the analyses became increasingly important also for political scientists in North America and Western Europe. The importance of context, and the availability of time-series statistical data made it possible to do longitudinal studies.

Still quoting from Jacobson's article it can be said that 'in the 1980s Political Science is ready to make the contribution that President Mushakoji projected, yet it will only be able to do this if the several trends of the 1970s are consolidated. If they are not consolidated there is a clear danger of Political Science becoming not one but a multiplicity of disciplines divided by geographic area and functional speciality. There is persuasive evidence that this is already happening'.

When parochialism in reading habits, publication for national audiences, is increasing (Holsti, 1985), Political Science will be incapable of making the universal contribution that is essential in an era of growing international interdependence.

In the light of these intra-disciplinary problems, together with the issue of the relation of Political Science to governments it was the Theme of the 1988 Congress of the International Political Science Association to explore the requirements and tasks involved to make the discipline truly global. Exchange of results of research is in itself a means to reduce geographically caused provincialism.

The Congress offered the opportunity to consider from all areas of the globe how Political Science can become more global together with the fundamental question whether Political Science should become more global.

Mushakoji argued for a commitment to universal norms of scientific procedures and an acceptance of a plurality of foci and approaches. 'It is only with the commitment to these universal norms, however, that the plurality of foci and approaches can be integrated into a single discipline' (Jacobson, 1988).

So, this 1988 Congress also provided an occasion for political scientists to investigate the possibility of an increasing use of universal norms of scientific procedures.

2.2. Specific Issues

Within the broad compass of the central theme, such specific issues as the meaning, requirements, and feasibility of Political Science being a truly global discipline have been explored.

The program consisted of four parts:
1. Mini-plenary and sub-field sections under the Main Theme, comprising 60 to 70 sessions.
2. Sections organized by IPSA Research Committees and Study Groups. Each Committee normally organized two sessions and each Study Group one session.
3. Special Sessions proposed by IPSA members, normally consisting of one session each.
4. Current Research Sessions consisting of papers on current research that do not fall within the subject matter of the program as it has been structured around the Theme, or within the areas of the Research Committees and Study Groups, or the Special Meeting.

To give an impression of the rich diversity of the exploration a number of titles and contributors, and in some cases questions arising from specific topics are indicated. These are taken from the many plenary sessions, mini-plenary sessions, sub-field sessions, research committee sessions, study group sessions, special sessions etc., held during the Congress (Program, 1988).

'Perspectives on Global Theory'

'Political Education Research as a Topic of Global Political Science'

'The Globalization of the Social Science Disciplines'

'The Pluralization of Political Science'

Has there been a trend toward unification or toward heterogeneity in modern political science in terms of the issues that are studied and the research techniques that are utilized. Do paradigms and methods cut across different regions, or are there unique regional approaches to the study of comparative and international politics? Can the major paradigms be identified, and if so, how are they interrelated?

'Political Philosophy and Theory'
Has political philosophy to be regarded as belonging to the proto-history of thinking about political matters, societal bonds and destiny of governed societies? Is it a purely speculative, normative and unscientific thought process?

'Comparative National Institutions'
The study of political institutions constitutes the oldest tradition in political science and remains one of its essential components. Comparisons between national institutions reflect both interest in their structural characteristics and -even more- interest in similarities and dissimilarities of their functions. While national institutions vary to a very high degree -in structures, functions and

in their underlying philosophical principles- such comparisons are essential for overcoming the tendency to see them as unique and uncomparable cross-nationally. Globalization of political science requires that nation-specific characteristics of the institutions be seen in a comparative perspective and that common functions -rather than specific structures- be taken into account.

'Political Science Methodology and Epistemology'
Questions: after behaviourism has there been a fragmentation of Political Science in terms of the development of numerous paradigms and research programmes or do we see a cross-fertilization of epistemological approaches enriching as well as strengthening the discipline? What methodologies and epistemologies allow us to best integrate rationalism and empiricism, behaviour and meaning, processes and institutions?

'Comparative Political Attitudes and Participation.'
This theme focusses on political attitudes and participation in the mass public. Areas of interest include citizen education and political socialization, group differences in political attitudes and participation (including gender and ethnicity), the effect of migration within and between nations.

2.3. Participation

This Congress was the largest, most diversified of IPSA's triennial Congresses. The program included 232 sessions. Seventy sessions were organized by Research Committees, and 24 by Study Groups.
One thousand, two hundred and sixty-five Political Scientists, scholars from other disciplines, and participants in and observers of government and politics took part in the sessions.
Participants came from 74 countries. These included: 20 countries in Africa and the Middle East; 12 in the Americas; 12 in Asia; 8 in Eastern Europe; 18 in Western Europe; and 8 in the Pacific. Twenty percent of the participants were women.

3. SLO and IPSA: Mutual Interests

3.1. SLO: Activities

The National Institute for Curriculum Development (SLO) founded in 1976 works for all types of education in the Netherlands, except higher education. Its main task is the development of curricula and the coordination of curriculum development for the Dutch educational system. It covers by its activities all school subject areas. It works mainly on request by the Minister of education and educational institutes.
SLO plans its work at several levels. It develops experimental teaching kits and e.g. audiovisual material to help schools create their own curricula. SLO also develops core curricula for specific branches of the educational system. SLO publishes its own books.
As a national Institute SLO does its work in close cooperation with the workers in the field and other educational publishers. When it seems relevant SLO also cooperates with trade and industry. SLO accomodates the special department of the National Information Centre for Learning Materials (NICL).
SLO is governed by a managing board representing the national educational bodies. It employs 300 persons and is nowadays regulated by the Educational Support Act of 1987.

It should be clear that, due to the freedom of choice for the content of curricula in the Netherlands, SLO documents have only the status of proposals to the educational system. No document is compulsory for schools. Proposals are submitted to the Minister of education who has to follow strictly several procedures in consulting all the autonomous subdivisions of the school system. Only after a thorough consultation new ideas can be introduced in the state schools which may lead to acceptation of the new curricula by other subdivisions of the system. Educational and political arguments are intertwined closely in the delicate balance between the wish and the right of subdividions of the education system to be free in making their own choices for specific curriculum content, and the wish and to a certain extent the right to get financial support from the central government (Van Bruggen, 1986; Jozefzoon, 1986).

An example of this situation was the activity of SLO in constructing curricula for projects aiming to change the rather traditional structure of secondary education into a modern comprehensive and middle school system. Because the central government for political reasons only could favour a developmental model in which all kinds of experiments had to be tested, SLO had the task and the possibility to contribute creatively to these experiments by providing ideas for new projects. These projects were introduced, guided and evaluated for a great number of schools leading to many reports in which the profits and problems were identified. The innovation concerned all the school

subject areas and the research of new clusters of integrated school subject areas. Also those major changes were identified that have to take place in the structure of the school system when a new school system should be facilitated.

According to the developmental model many of these experiments still exist but the new idea of 'basic education' -compulsory education for all pupils- for age 12 to 15/16 now colors the discussion and the work of SLO. The idea of 'basic education' is developing in the context of the European ideas on this type of education. The focus question is: what knowledge and skills are essential for functioning as a member of a more internationally oriented society, and what will be a potential handicap when this knowledge is lacking?

Another SLO activity is the development and implementation of a large scale project on the integration of development education in Dutch schools. For this purpose the National Development Education Network was established in 1986. This network is firmly supported by the Minister of Development Aid and by the Minister of Education and Science at the request of the Parliament. One of the objectives is to promote a greater awareness of development issues such as the North-South issue. As this program also focusses on tension and conflicts arising from underdevelopment it is by definition an example of political education. It is also an example of the internationalization of social studies for defining and improving educational objectives.
Another example of a SLO curriculum for political education is the one that has been tested out since September 1988 in the top level of a number of secondary schools. Its main purpose is the improvement of quality and integration of social and political education in the Dutch educational system. The project will last three years.

From this short introduction of SLO it may be clear that SLO is interested in shifts in political ideas on education. It is important for SLO to know the development of the political sciences in general, e.g. by participating in IPSA activities. In particular it is important to understand the possibility changing ideas on political education because in the future SLO may also be asked to continue the development of curricula for political education.

3.2. Political Education

After the identification of the role of education at the end of this century and the beginning of the 21th century (Hooghoff & Van der Dussen, 1988) it seems clear enough that education being one of society's main duties, requires serious studies that will clear the road for new and better forms of participation in the world they live in for all peoples.
It needs to look nowadays for an intelligent introduction to the ways social groups participate in the decision-making process. On the one hand this identifies the need of research on the professional development of teachers as far as teachers have to be prepared for new curricula in which the new demands are formulated (Van der Dussen, 1988f).
On the other hand it can be argued that one part of the new curricula could be 'a political education in the schools, that would enable students to understand their reality, and to participate in the decisions that affect them'. This 'could be an alternative to assist

in solving some of the problems of today' (Conley, 1988).
However, in spite of this legitimization, political education is faced with a number of essential problems. The absence of a consistent body of subject matter derived from academic disciplines is one of them. Another one is the absence of teachers trained in this field. The extremely broad definition given to political education is the major difficulty. It ranges from an introduction to social sciences to the study of recent events in society, and from spotlights on the functioning of democracy to the propagation of certain commitments to labeled politics. In the Netherlands we see a growing consensus.

In a democratic society many people play their roles in defining what should be desirable as the content of the curriclum for this subject area: the government, teachers, publishers, and others.
Nowadays the new phenomenon of international cooperation and information exchange seems to be very important for the improvement of the position of political studies and political education. At a conference in Cologne (1987), organized by the European Research Committee of IPSA, the recommendation was made to seek opportunities for cross-cultural cooperation. Expertise in the field of curriculum development, training and research should be combined and made available to all European institutes. The fundamental question is: what core of knowledge, insight and skills does a pupil need in a developing, pluralistic society of today and tomorrow? Which task does the school have with regard to democratic political education? This calls for answers to questions as: how do we define democracy and politics? Which basic concepts and instruments for analysis are the principal ones? Which values have a fundamental meaning for the curriculum e.g. considering that history and geography as part of 'civic education' are controversial subjects in a pluralistic society. The discussion on the content of the curriculum for 'basic education' becomes more accute when the content of political education is discussed in terms of the limited responsibility of a society for the school system.

It can be argued (Hooghoff, 1988a) that the international exchange of information among nations and the extension of the discussion from one national, pluralistic society to e.g. the European region could be favourable to identify problems and solutions. It also may be the start of a real cooperation in Europe.
A more complementary policy can be pursued by joint projects of different countries. This is in line with the policy of the European Commission whose policy is directed towards joint activities of educational institutes from member countries.
In accordance with SLO's tradition of curriculum development and Brussels' policy, SLO has submitted a proposal for a project which aims at enhancing the European Dimension. This proposal puts emphasis on bringing together institutes for the integration of the European Dimension in the curricula for political education.

Here we see the beginning of the integration of information derived from IPSA activities -more specifically from the IPSA Research Committee on Political education- and a national Institute (SLO), aiming at a 'European Platform' for the development of political education.
Building a network this way is a political activity. Like other activities this one also is not free from values. But it is a democratic activity which informs institutes from various cultures on educational expertise for political education. The work of such a

network should be characterized by the integration of curriculum development with research and the promotion of expertise.
The ultimate goal is not only the scholarly understanding of the diversity of cultural and educational data but to find out how in education the best possible contribution can be made to the awareness of the greater society of the Family of Man.

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Part II Selected Papers

5. Selected Papers

5.1 Trends of the Current West German Educational Policy

Heike Ackermann,
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5.1.1. Introduction

This paper tries to show the current development of educational policy in its effects on the educational system of West Germany, not in an empirical way, but by some exaggerated theses. It seems impossible to describe and explain the German educational system in its entity, considering history and the changes caused by political influences. The paper argues from a normative point of view that the concept of education in its emergence has a wide meaning and emphasizes the relevance of personal development and self-determination. There exist some indications that the educational system is mainly considered with regard to social utility and with the consequence of reducing the concept of education by political interests. The paper intends to elucidate those theses.

5.1.2. Education policy under social demand functions

Education policy is a significant part of societal policy. It determines the functions and goals of the educational system. A country's educational system is influenced in its structure and nature, by history, politics and the characteristics of the country, by its socio-cultural phenomenons. The educational system of West Germany includes the public school system (Hearnden, 1976),.vocational training, (continued education (Weinberg 1981) and universities (Hüfnersrau, 1987). Decision-making and the dimension of competence are differently distributed to the administrations of the Länder and the Federal Government, in this case, the Ministry of Education and Science. Education in the Federal Republic is the responsibility of the individual Länder, which retain cultural autonomy (Kulturhoheit) and, therefore, if schools are considered as subordinate elements of the hierachical system of public administration, any substantial change is not an educational affair which may be left to educationists, but a political one. Due to the cultural autonomy of the Länder with their different types of government, and the sharing of competences between the Länder and the Federal Government we cannot presuppose a consistent educational policy. But within the dominant values on the future purpose, role and meaning of education in a context of structural change in economy and society, a common basis of administrators and policy-makers is visible. The importance of education depended on the belief that it can influence the character and conduct of individuals, and thus the nature of the social pattern. Therefore, the educational system is linked with policy due to educational institutions aiming to prepare young people for their societal and political life. In the context of these functions we have to ask for the content of such education: is it meant as an introduction to the most important forms of knowledge, or as a

preparation and training in the skills, required in future occupations, or has it something to do with encouraging internal personal capacities to be developed? This issue reflects the dimension of decision-making of educational policy, and raises the question of the control mechanism of content and direction of education as to social expectations linked with and the determination interests of social development. Significantly, education policy has a regulating function, suiting the educational system to social demands. The paper tries to describe the governing ideas in education policy, as to the difficulty meeting the needs and goals of society in its existing social structure, undergoing structural changes according to the needs of individuals. The key issues, here, show, which aspects of culture are selected as being worthwile, and who does the selection.

5.1.3. Transition from 'non-reform' to reforms

Characterizing education as a keystone of reform and modernization of the Federal Republic, different approaches to differentiating periods and decades in education policy are evaluated (Kanz, 1987). Mainly, till the end of the 60s two decades of 'non-reform' in the public school system have to be observed. The following reform-era until the mid 1970s, accompanied by curriculum reforms, stronger approval of comprehensive schools and the expansion of secondary and higher education was cut off by financial shortage and a transition within politics, realizing different urgent social demands and goals. After this period, we see a regrettable roll back of reforms and a stop in education policy.

Setting up an educational commission by the Parliament of the Federal Republic might appear as a change. A task was set to evaluate the future challenge in its meaning for the educational system, and to produce a first report in 1988. The assignment of the commission shows that the public system of education is a national concern. Which effects enduced this phenomenon? Presently the significance and relevance of education for economic needs will be discussed and compared with the transition from 'non-reform' to reforms in the public school system. This belief in the pre-eminent value of national welfare by a production of manpower as the main task of the educational system, defines and shapes the functions of education. The view that education would have important consequences for the economy was articulated at the beginning of the 60s. The expansion of secondary and higher education was seen as a precondition for economic growth and modernization because it would provide manpower with the relevant skills and knowledge to manage and elaborate new technology. Education was conceived as an important form of investment. It seems peculiar that the expansion of education was accompanied by the assumption of education as a civil right (Dahrendorf). This can be explained by the rising criticism which aims at the improvement of knowledge with respect to social needs, fighting against traditional and conservative structures. In consequence, equality of chances and social justice for the deprived were demanded.

5.1.4. The sources of the governing ideas in education policy

The future governing ideas, dominating the educational debate are based on a very narrow range of (re)sources. The West German Minister of Education and Science, J. Möllemann, shapes and determines the

ideological context in which educational institutions operate. He has a key position not only in funding priorities, but projecting the values that should lead to economic success. A new kind of governmental utilitarism is seeking more vocational degrees and potential scientists and technologists. With reference to interventions, the role of central government implementing educational policy can be questioned for. The aspect of 'vocationalisation' is related to the specific competence and limited powers of the Minister on the one hand. He is responsible for vocational training and vocational continuing education. But on the other hand the governmental approach to vocational training is important in the context of the relationship between education and training and national prosperity. It raises issues fundamental to the relationship between education and society. These policies concerned with linking education to industry need to be understood in relation to the form and persistence of wider social unequalities, referring to certain contradictions between preconditions providing education and the demand for priority for social utility, and the service function of education.

This can be shown in 4 educational fields:
1. vocational training concerning school leavers;
2. continuing education;
3. studies and
4. school curricula.

1. The Minister stresses the role of education, preparing young people for lifelong working. Especially in the context of a common European Market in 1992 and its effects, he emphasizes the relevance of vocational preparation. But the problem of youth unemployment which cannot be solved by training has not dominated educational policy initiatives. They are only a few programmes, designed for those staying on at school after the school leaving age and without job and contract, or without having completed secondary modern school, and who are pursuing neither a specific vocational course nor further studies. Such programmes with the official aim to extend access to those who failed in conventional schooling are specifically geared to socializing those by a general preparation for work and affecting their attitudes. Didactic approaches to enhance social equality of opportunity by education are rare and difficult to run without changing preconditions and structures of school and learning processes.
   The belief is that the problem of youth unemployment will be solved by a decrease in the birthrate and an increasing demand for young trainees by prospective employers.

2. The fourth sector of the educational system, continuing education, is very complex in its structure of private and public educational institutions. Some attempts can be observed, disturbing the balance between public responsibility providing facilities for adult learning as an intergral part of the infrastructure of education, and the independence of the institutions. Currently, in spite of this, the adult education laws of the individual Länder have the mission to support liberal adult education (i.e., everybody can attend courses in any field of personal interest), adult education is mainly conceived as an instrument to solve labour market problems and gain more relevance in this respect. Because of the need of up-dating vocational knowledge undergoing economic and technological change, supply and demand of programmes in the fields

of political education, leisure time activities and education for individual help are curtailed. Structures and preconditions of continuing education were influenced by the introduction of the principle of competition between public and private institutions, competing for a raising number of their participants due to an increasing necessity of self-financing of the public institutions (Hufer, 1988). While the social effects of a two-thirds majority of people with jobs against the jobless within the society are discussed, vocational perfection and training have gained more and more priority.

3. The development of society has led to an increasing number of occupations, where scientific knowledge and the application of its methods are necessary to meet job requirements adequately. This development depends on the expansion of the universities as an inevitable precondition of modernization. In West Germany, we do now have 20-25 per cent of an age group studying at the universities, and the trend points upward. The recent expansion in terms of student enrolments confronted universities with new problems, because - in so far as predominantly technological sciences and pure research are provided, and social studies not very well funded - excellence in research and teaching suffered. The question arises whether the university system serves as a parking lot for young people who otherwise would be unemployed? And how can the universities react until the expected decrease of enrolment by the end of the century?
Pointing at performance in higher education, Hüfner and Rau observe that many concepts, originally related to the field of economics, entered the discussion on alternative higher education policies. But changing the framework of conditions in favour of a functioning competition of universities by more transparency, thus indicating the intention to increase quality of research as well as efficiency of resource utilization, major policy changes cannot be expected in the very near future. The Minister of Education and Science stimulates the debate as to performance indicators with the demand for limitations of the length of courses, to rule out disadvantages for German students with regard to the European common market with an emerging new kind of social mobility as a result.

4. Although several attempts to introduce new subjects into school curricula failed, the topic of new technologies and computer literacy has been introduced into lower and higher secondary school curricula (pupils from 13 +).
Curriculum development is a very hard to manage and influenced by tradition and the tripartite secondary system in West Germany with its function to regulate access to higher education. Some of the educational goals of the non-implemented subjects, for instance ecological and environmental education, peace education, the principles of law and order and the constitution, the German Grundgesetz, should be fulfilled by political education with an integrative method. But the contribution and the dimension of civics has already been curtailed in schools, therefore civics cannot ensure its many purposes. In consequence of the view that micro-computers have become a sign of the times, computer literacy seems to be conceived as a compulsary course of general technological instruction. Actually, it is a kind of vocational training, implemented in the 'secret garden' of the curriculum, because computer literacy particularly applies to instruction in computer manipulation. Despite this, the diffusion of new

technologies into working life, and its effects on the demand for labour is highly overestimated (Alex, 1987). Schools looked, how computers could be integrated into existing curricula and organizational structures. The policy of adaptation assumes that computers would conform to the classic criteria, implicit in the construction and transmission of the traditional school curriculum. The school curriculum has traditionally provided -apart from different issues- the epistemological and evaluative basis for what is called 'valid knowledge'. Continually developing hardware, in the beginning sponsored by the micro-computer industry, and a varied quality of the available software, find their way into schools. The concentration of resources on computers leads to a lack of interest in the implications of a rapid technological development and fails to evaluate the nature and purpose of school. There is a danger that technology will be uncritically implemented, because a similar innovation strategy seems to be absent.

Innovations in schools are usually embedded in a lot of rhetoric. In this case of modelling curricula to suit modern conditions, it has been argued that preparation for a working life is one of the most important functions of school. The rigorous pursuit of one function may impede the accomplishment of others. The priority and close links with the economic needs can lead to the assumption that an economic preoccupation is dominating, which districts schools from the task of meeting the personal development needs of each person. Even if schools cannot remain untouched by technological development, the introduction of new technology necessitates a careful evaluation of the results for pedagogy, methodology and structures.

5.1.5. Final remarks about the necessity of controlling the technologically and economically influenced developments in society

As has been pointed out, the changed structures of the educational institutions and the contents of education have consequences for the socialization of young people and adults. They are forced to accept vocational training and the up-dating of vocational knowledge as their 'life-insurance' in a more and more unsteady world. A lot of uncertainty will come into their lives, because the 'learning society', which requires on going economic and technological changes, means that retraining people increases as much as the uncertainty of job perspectives. Some of them will try to obtain qualifications, others will be deterred by further social constraints and will become dropouts.
The stress of qualification and of the problems of an industrialized country without any raw material, other than 'human capital' - so it has been emphasized by the Minister of Education and Science - showscts that education often acts as a medium to claim national priorities. It seems to be a particularly appropriate vehicle for discussing the future of society in general, but it is a monologue. The goals of education - equal opportunities and social justice in the 1960s as well as vocational preparation and a lifelong learning for up-dating vocational knowledge in the 1980s - in contrary have reflected and helped to reproduce the dominant belief and expectations of society. The context of education is being transformed by increasingly rapid social and economic change. The political action consists in maintaining the present situation, i.e., the structures

which cause and increase social unequality are untouched and persisting. Unequality is justified as a prerequisite for social dynamics. The national purpose hidden behind that justification is not revealed, but decidedly it may be articulated: to survive in the world-market. And to make an oversubtle assertion, one could say that leadership within a tough competition is claimed. The consequence is that the gap between the leading industrialized nations and those being at a disadvantage will be widened. That is the uncomfortable issue, and an aspect of internationalization and interdependence. At the same time, we find a process of adaptation, and of segmentation and increasing social unequality as the result of dependence (Kälble, 1987).

Some authors pointed out that the aspect of 'vocationalisation' in education in the assumption that it may be an instrument to reduce unemployment and economic decline can be found in France (Tanguy, 1987) and England (Young, 1987) in a similar way. Competition and rivalry regarding leadership by technology intensifies social problems rather than solves them. All sectors of society are reviewed as to which of them are suitable and useful with regard to the challenge. To a certain extent this means a conversion of society. In this context, instrumentalist theories will focus on the value of conformity between educational provision and the supposed needs of a particular society. The economic decline, increasing competition, structural unemployment, societal consequences due to crisis of social welfare, environmental issues and vital problems of individuals, raise fundamental questions about the nature of modernization and, significantly, the role of citizens. What have those responsible done in order to make all members of society understand social development, i.e., have influence on it?

A democratic society will need to choose whether cohesion and authority in the policy derive from imposed control, or wether the direction and development of social change are negotiated. At the present time, it seems that objections are not welcome and that a rational dialogue and communication at a time of major structural change is impeded.

One could ask, why isn't there any resistance against all this? Torsten Husen notes that 'there are no universal paradigms for the conduct of educational reforms' (1986: 53), but he assumed a strategy of reform by consciousness and consent. Today, we find, hidden in a secret garden of the curriculum, or as an effect of influenced educational structures, a kind of hidden reforms. The consequences of this seem difficult to evaluate.

The administrators act as if they were prepared to follow the advice of Husen, that 'changes in the educational system have to occur gradually and slowly, in case they are not associated with what is virtually a political and/or social revolution' (55).

Education reflects the society in which it is embedded. Consequently, in a political and culturally partitioned society this segmentation reflects itself in its education. The concept of education is reduced to the opinion of what education contributes to the growth of a technologically developed nation. People are only subordinate factors and not provided with sovereign power, because there is lack of transparency. One ought to look at the social and political forces behind a reform, how they emerge and how they act, Husen said.

The slogan of equal opportunities and of educational reforms as an equalizer of opportunities disappeared, and the need of adaptation and general capacities in flexibility are required. There is a widening

gap between individual expectations and social demands.
I'm not astimished that political education as a possible adversary is not supported. And the challenge which is placed in the way of political education is the challenge for the policy of the 1990s.

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5.2 Curriculum Development in Political Education, particulary the International Dimension New Developments in the Netherlands

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5.2.1. Introduction

This paper gives a general outline of the development and the status quo of political education in the Netherlands, focusing particularly on the degree of internationalization. In the light of current and future educational-political developments, attention is given subsequently to the consolidation of the position of the North-South issue in the curriculum and the political demand to give the theme the curriculum, and the political demand to give the theme 'Europe' a structural place.

5.2.2. Status

Developments and internationalization
In the sixties, social change and discussions in education in the US and Western Europe gave rise to a different definition of the term 'curriculum'. Attention shifted from descriptions of subject matter to planning of the form and structure of teaching. The term 'curriculum' acquired a more dynamic flavour. This was characteristic of those days, when socioeconomic progress and personal development were high priority issues.
Starting in the US, and later followed by countries like West Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, curriculum development projects were launched. First, as usual, for mathematics and sciences (the Sputnik effect!) and only much later for the social subjects.
Responding to the demand for socially relevant education aimed at the individual, the social and the political sciences tried to gain a stronger position in the school curriculum.
Within the context of national and international democratization movements, these efforts contributed to the initiation of curriculum projects for political education in several countries. Especially in the early seventies these projects were often characterized by academic discussions, supporters and opponents argued about the desirability and feasibility of pedagogical and didactic starting points.
In countries like West Germany, the U.K. and the Netherlands, these curriculum activities produced a wide range of teaching material, with both good and bad practical examples. By the end of the seventies, teachers, but also the inspectorate and the government, acknowledge the importance of 'political competence'.

However, in spite of this legitimization, political education was and still is faced with a number of essential problems, such as the absence of a consistent body of subject matter derived form academic disciplines. This is reflected in the extremely broad definition given to polical education in schools. It varies from an introduction to the social sciences to studies of current events, from a spotlight on

government and parliament even to the propagation of certain political views of parties. The quantity of teaching materials has failed to contribute to an improvement of the quality of political education. To achieve effective political education, aimed to cause well-founded opinions about social issues and political competence, other strategies and conditions are apparently necessary.
Especially in the eighties, new topics demand the attention of the teacher, mainly for moral reasons: Development Education, Intercultural Education, Peace Education, Human Rights Education, etc. Although these new 'movements' give an impetus to pedagogical innovation, at the same time they threaten the concreteness and validity of the subject matter of Political Education. They offer the possibility of adding a global dimension to the curriculum, but they take no account of the overlap, the limitations of the timetable, and the risk of fragmentation. The so-called global studies overemphasize the affective goals, and pay little attention to sound subject matter. Global education has not seldom been considered synonymous with biased social criticism. One of the results of this trend is that in the Netherlands, but also in the U.K. and West Germany, the image of political education has deteriorated. Political education was identified with radical social movements, and in fact had to be justified all over again.

The curriculum project 'Social and Political Education'
From 1981 to 1987, a project was carried out at the National Institute for Curriculum Development (SLO), on the subject of 'Social and Political Education'. This curriculum project, aimed primarily to enhancing the quality and implementation of political education, resulted in:
- a core curriculum for social and political education for pupils, 14-16 years old;
- a handbook for planning this school subject area;
- lesson plans of series of lessons as examples of the core curriculum.

Teachers, teacher training colleges, the inspectorate and research centres were involved in the project. Until 1985 all efforts were focused on achieving a minimum consensus about starting points and goals on a national level. Considering the suspicious attitude of parents, teachers, government and unions, reaching a minimum consensus was imperative to the innovation strategy.

By defining as unambiguously as possible the minimum of knowledge and insight pupils must acquire to form an opinion concerning national as well as international issues, and by offering concrete lesson examples, the project has contributed to the achievement of the desired consensus in the Netherlands. The participants have also to be credited, because without the support of enthusiastic teachers with widely different views, the stimulating role of the government and the inspectorate, and also pupils who saw the 'point' in political education, the succes of the project would not have been possible. But consensus alone is not enough. It says nothing about the extent to which political education has gained a self-evident position in school practice. In other words, it says nothing about the extent to which effective implementation has taken place. By setting up an experimental examination in 'Social and Political Education' until 1992, linking up closely with the designed core curriculum, at least a start has been made with an implementation strategy.

In October 1988, a university research center will complete a study among 40 schools as to how the teaching initials that were developed

cab be used and transfered to other situations. In this way we hope to develop tools for implementation which will guarantee a wider distribution and use of the results of the project. One of the things that has to be studied carefully is what product specifications a teaching kit must meet if it is to lead to other and better learning outcomes, and the adoption of a new 'outlook' by teachers.
(An evaluation report on the project 'Social and Political Education 1981-1987' and a report of the implementation study can be obtained from the National Institute for Curriculum Development on request.)

The content of social and political studies
In answering the question of what determines the content, three points should be taken into account:
- the demand of the pupil to be equiped in such a way that he or she is able to find his or her own place in society, for example by knowing about phenomena and problems and having formed an opinion about them;
- the demand of society for well-equiped people, who can function adequately in society and are able to cope with the phenomena and problems encountered in society:
- the instruments offered by the social sciences (political science and sociology) for analyzing social and political phenomena and problems.

These three points are also reflected in the general goals 'the pupils are able to cope with'. It indicates a need to learn on the part of the pupils. 'Learning to cope with current social and political phenomena and problems' refers to a demand on the part of society, namely that pupils should have insight into these phenomena and problems and how decisions are made in society with regard to these matters and what rules are involved in this process. Overemphasizing this aspect leads to 'adapting political education', in which case the forming of opinions by pupils is pushed into the background. 'On the basis of relevant and reliable information' has to do with the scientific instruments offered particularly by the social sciences for analyzing social and political phenomena and problems.
In other words, if a balanced body of subject matter is to be determined all these criteria implicit in the general goal must be taken into account. It can be realized:
a. by working thematically, which means that social and political phenomena and problems are presented in a context the pupils do understand;
b. by distinguishing thematic fields, imposing a structure on social and political phenomena and problems by which the demand from society can be met;
c. by using approaches and key concepts borrowed form the social sciences.

We have chosen to sequence subject matter in thematic fields, with the purpose to structure social problems and to present them in a way pupils can understand. A thematic field is a framework for mapping out social and political phenomena and problems which can be recognized and viewed in their interlinked relations. The following thematic fields can be regarded as a concrete organization of the day-to-day reality of teachers' situations:

1. Education	family, relationships, mass media
2. Living environment	cultural minorities, environment
3. Work and leisure	unemployment, social benefits
4. Technology and society	privacy, the information society

5. State and society	political decision-making, crime and criminal law, parliamentary democracy
6. International relations	North-South, East-West issues European Studies.

Approaches
By determining the thematic fields it has been made clear what kind of social and political phenomena and problems are to be discussed. Still unexplained is how this is to be done, what instruments are to be used. Social and political phenomena and problems are analyzed in the following way:
1. from the point of view of the various social groups; proceeding of power and authority (and corresponding positions) are involved; proceeding from the question what standards, values and expectations underlie one's own actions and those of others; proceeding from the question what goals and means are involved in one's own actions and those of others;
2. against the background of the development of the phenomenon or problem under scrutiny;
3. in comparison to similar problems in different societies.

The following key concepts are used in the approach: (views of) groups, power, authority, position, standards, values, expectations, goals, means.

Summary
After a very pragmatically oriented practice at classroom level followed by a period of many academic disputes on a more theoretical level characterized by a strong social criticism, now clarity and consensus have grown concerning the goal and content of social and political education in The Netherlands. So, justification has been achieved. All energy now must be given to the task of implementation to promote and guarantee the quality of social and political education. On the one hand new developments with regard to educational content and educational policy in The Netherlands and other Western European countries are threatening the position of political education but on the other hand this offers a possibility of placing more emphasis in subject matter on internationalization.

5.2.3. Political education and the international dimension: new possibilities for integration

Basic education for young people
In a great many European countries, including The Netherlands, there is an increasing tendency to lengthen the period of basic education - that is compulsory education for all pupils. Equally international is the tendency to focus the educational program on knowledge. This implies a prominent role for academic subjects.
In general, the necessity and importance of basic education is explicitly acknowledged. The ideal has been accepted that pupils should acquire skills which are considered indispensable in our (Western European) society now and in the future. Deficiencies in the area of basic skills could lead to unbalanced personal development, and undermine the ability to cope with politics and social phenomena. Basic education is also important for the improvement of the qualification of the working population. Furthermore, basic education can set limits for the responsibility of the school. In other words, what belongs to curricular and what to extracurricular socialization? What is the basic task of school, and what is not? One of the

selection criteria in determining the content of basic education is: 'what knowledge and skills are essential for functioning as a member of a more and more internationally oriented society; which subjects not learnt at school, would provide a lasting handicap?'

This criterion is particularly important to the further consolidation of the status and position of Political Education, and the integration of international aspects in subject matter. However, this does entail that choices must be made within this broad field of global studies. For time at school is not only limited, it is also expensive. And not everything the media bring into our homes is an object for information transfer. In this context it should be observed that the Dutch government will prescribe learning outcomes, as the U.K. also intends to do. Learning outcomes can be seen as minimum qualifications, involving knowledge, insight and skills, which all pupils must at least possess on leaving school. The Dutch government has commisioned the National Institute for Curriculum Development to submit proposals for all 14 (!) compulsory subjects of basic education at the end of 1988, in consultation with educational institutions and social groups. These subjects include two modern foreign languages, and History, Economics and Social and Political Studies. The latter are not to be taught as an integrated cluster but as separate subjects with their own specific objects of study.
The necessary choices to be made among international themes will be among development education (the North-South issue), East-West relations, and the 'high-priority' European Dimension (which will be discussed in more detail further on).

In the Dutch situation increasing attention to international issues will of course not be limited to the curriculum for Political Studies. Geography, History and Economics will also make room for international aspects in the proposals they submit. Traditionally, the teaching of Geography and History has always included the discussion of Third World problems, the power blocks Russia and America, and Europe. However, the linkup between subject matter in different fields deserves further study and consultation in order to achieve a more coherent educational offering. Analysis has shown that many methods used in the social sciences overlap, and this leads to fragmentation. Perhaps needless to say, there is no intention of adding 'new subject fields' to the social sciences. The object is to define the 'basic' of international themes, and to integrate these in the subjects of compulsory basic education.

Example

* DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION	G	H	E	P	
	E	I	C	O	S
	O	S	O	L	T
* EAST-WEST RELATIONS	G	T	N	I	U
	R	O	O	T	D
	A	R	M	I	I
* EUROPEAN EDUCATION	P	Y	I	C	E
	H		C	A	S
	Y		S	L	

Putting things together in Western Europe, one can observe a tendency to extend the period of compulsory basic education to the age of 15/16 and to develop core curricula with learning outcomes. In The Netherlands the functions ascribed to basic education clearly point out the necessity of social and political education.

Basic education for young people in a more and more internationalized society would be incomplete and unbalanced if it did not explicitly include social, political and cultural characteristics of our (Dutch) society in relation to characteristics of other societies.

Integration of development education in social and political education
The integration of development education in Dutch schools has a broad social and political basis. This is reflected in the initiation of the Educational Project for Development Aid (EPOS, 1982-1986) and the National Development network, was initiated by the Ministers of Development Aid and of Education and Science, at the request of the Parliament. The objective of the National Development Education Network is to help guarantee a permanent place for development education in the school curriculum in a manner in accordance with the principles of good teaching, in order to promote greater awareness of development issues and to increase public support for development issues and to increase public support for development aid. This network which will be operative until 1992, is a joint undertaking of institutions active in the field of curriculum development, research and in-service training and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The network also cooperates closely with teachers at primary and secondary schools. The National Institute for Curriculum Development (SLO) sees to the project management.
There is a general consensus regarding the necessity of structural attention to the North-South issue in education. As for the question how to realize this educational aim, little or no agreement existed a few years ago. The idea of 'let a thousand flowers bloom' caused schools to be flooded with an incessant stream of lesson letters, files on countries, newsletters, slide series, video tapes, source books, etc. Gradually a 'mountain' of teaching material grew, consisting for the most part of non-commercial publications. However, looking back, their influence on the content of education has been negligible. A study done in 1980 showed that teaching on the North-South issue for 14 to 16-years olds was rather fragmentary and one-sided. Many used methods, the survey concluded, hardly offered pupils political insight into the relations between the Third World and our world.

It came to be realized that for an effective improvement of education, i.e. more coherent knowledge regarding the background and origins of the development problem and possible solutions, more is needed than a large quantity of teaching material. Especially in our 'no-nonsense' era, this calls for a carefully planned development and implementation strategy. In the Dutch situation, this entails that implementation can only be effective if development education is made a compulsory element of the curricula for the social subjects. It should not be taught as a separate subject, but integrated into the existing curricula, as an integral theme in the thematic field 'International Relations' in political education. A recent Unesco study on global themes in education also argues in favour of the 'infusional approach' when it comes to new subject matter.

The Network has designed core curricula for development education to be used in the social subjects, with the general goal:
'to cultivate in pupils the knowledge, skills, sense of values, and attitudes necessary for a sound insight into, and a well-founded opinion about the North-South issue: the existence of people in Third World countries compared to and in relation to that of people in wealthy countries'.

The following elements of subject matter are important:
a. the way of life of people in Third World countries;
b. the poverty problem, the development issue and development aid;
c. 'thinking', in terms of development.

These elements have been fleshed out in terms of goal and content for each subject, and as it were 'parcelled out' to offer maximum opportunity for integration.

Curriculum for development education:

Primary education	1st stage of secondary education 12-16 years	2nd stage of secondary education 16-19 years
- The ways of life of people in Third World countries, in relation to the situation in wealthy countries.		
	- Background: the issues of poverty and development, development cooperation.	
		- Opinions on the development issue.

In primary education the emphasis will be on introducing the presence of people in Third World countries. The pupil learns about the various ways of life in the Third World: the cultural diversity. In secondary education further light will be shed on this presence by gradually giving more attention of Third World countries and its relation to development in wealthy countries and development aid. In addition, to add depth to the pupils' insight, and to offer a better basis for forming opinions, several views are discussed on the backgrounds of and possible solutions to the North-South problem.
Political education focuses on tension and conflicts arising from underdevelopment, discussing such topics as: the national and international balance of power, human rights, cultural problems, Dutch development aid policy, opportunities for citizens to participate.
Apart from the above-mentioned core curricula for development education in the subjects Geography, History, Economics and Political Education, models of lesson series and handbooks have been produced. In addition more and more regional workshops are being organized for teachers, in which opportunities are also offered for cooperating with museums and Third World organizations. From August 1989 onwards all efforts will be aimed at dissemination and in-service training. For this purpose, arrangements have been made with educational publishers and examination boards.
In all honesty it must be admitted that, in spite of the fairly good infrastructure for the coordination of development, training and research activities and an annual budget of one million dollars, the position of development education in classroom practice remains marginal for the time being. The problem is that development education has to compete with other claims on the curriculum like peace education, environmental studies, intercultural studies, consumer education, law-related education and recently in the Netherlands, studies of World War II in relation to the present. Moreover, research has shown that teachers are not interested in in-service training, and

pupils generally do not feel very involved with the topic 'Third World'. Or, to quote what a large number of pupils recently claimed: 'Pop music does more to call attention to the world's problems than Dutch politics'. We need only think of 'Live Aid' in 1985 and the Nelson Mandela concert of June 1988.

In brief, with the construction of the National Development Education Network, the Dutch Government has made a constructive contribution toward the internationalization of the curriculum of social studies. This great step forward could prove to be of lasting importance within the perspective of the future introduction of basic education. In order to improve the quality of development education and give it a structural place in classroom practice, activities are coordinated in the field of curriculum development, research, designing examination programs, analysing teaching material, information supply, initial and in-service training, counseling and curriculum evaluation.

Embedding the European Dimension in education

A third factor which could give a more international character to political education is the draft resolution of the Ministers of Education of the European Community in May 1988 regarding the consolidation of the European dimension in education. By means of several new coordinated measures in the period 1988-1992, the resolution is meant to contribute to:

- young people becoming more aware of the European identity, the value of European civilization and of its foundations, particularly the protection of the principles of democracy, social justice and respect for human rights;
- young people realizing the advantages of the Community, but also what challenges they will encounter on gaining access to a larger economic and social territory;
- young people improving their knowledge about the historical, cultural, economic and social aspects of the Community and its Member States, and realizing the significance of the cooperation between the Member States of the European Community and other countries in Europe and the rest of the world.

To achieve a 'Europe for the Citizens', the Member States have been urged to take measures within the limits of their own specific educational policies. More specifically, there are plans to publish a policy document focusing on a structural place for the European dimension in the educational programs for History, Geography, Economics and Social Sciences, among other subjects. Initital and in-service teacher training should also explicitly make room for the European dimension. Within Member States this could be realized by offering high-quality teaching material and instructing staff at teacher training colleges. An international way of achieving this aim is cooperation between teacher training colleges with the object of increasing the mobility of students and teachers. In any case, it is clear that the European Community will stimulate cooperation between teachers to promote the integration process. For pupils, too, more and more opportunities will be created for actually experiencing what everyday life is like in other European countries.

With a view to the 'magic' year 1992 -Europe without boundaries- colloquia will be organized under the auspices of the European Commission. The aim of these colloquia is to analyze the effectiveness of curriculum and implementation strategies now in use, and to explore possibilities of collaboration. From 1989 on, a Summer University will

be held each year for staff of teacher training colleges and specialists. It is hoped that this exchange and experience will lead to the discovery of new and better strategies for introducing the European dimension. In short, the next few years will be dominated by European Unification. Of course, this partly motivated by the desire to strenghten Europe's economic position in relation to Japan and the USA. In 1992, a comparative study will have to prove whether young people's knowledge has actually improved. Already it is evident that the available funds and the political will vary from country to country.

Developments until now

Over the last 10 to 15 years, a wide range of initiatives has been taken at national and European levels aimed at bringing Europe or the so-called European dimension into the schools. Handouts have been written for teachers, colourful information brochures have been distributed, teachers' conferences have been held, joint projects have been launched, audiovisual materials have been developed and model curricula have been presented. However, from recent publications we observe that the so-called European dimension is only marginally represented in curricula, teaching methods and classroom practice in the European member states. A comparative study of several countries has yielded extremely disappointing results. Poor results, however, demand an analysis. Why do the publications of non-governmental organizations in Germany, The Netherlands and Britain have so little influence on Social Studies curricula and classroom practice? Is this to be blamed on the quality of the teaching material and published handbooks, or on the absence of a development and implementation strategy? Or are materials developed that the average teacher can do without? Or is an NGO such as a small-scale centre for European Studies doomed to a place on the periphery of the educational system, its impact reaching no further than a few interested schools? Or is it because public support for European education is lacking, while national authorities sit on the fence? Or is it due to the absence of a well-constructed curriculum project offering a coherent description of development strategy, evaluation, training and dissemination?

In any case, it is evident that the suggestions put forward in various papers are rather incoherent, and lack sufficient basis to offer a perspective in the medium term. Attention is focused on teachers, schools, development of teaching material, and a more prominent role for non-governmental organizations, without any indication being given of the minimal conditions for the structural embedding of the European dimension. The structural embedding entails the compulsory inclusion of the European dimension in the teaching matter of Social Studies. Without this, discussion of Europe at school will remain an entirely noncommittal matter, up to the willingness of teachers to adopt such themes. This would imply a continuation of current classroom practice, in which Europe comes up for discussion once in a while, more or less accidentally, without system and without specially developed didactics.

If the European Dimension must acquire a more prominent and meaningful place in Dutch education, a core curriculum must be formulated, to which various interest groups contribute, and which puts forward valid proposals on content, place and didactics of this peripheral thematic field. Furthermore, suggestions should be offered how to incorporate the European Dimension into existing school subjects such as History, Economics, Geography and Political Education, and practical hints should be given for classroom teaching. The high priority of a core

curriculum as a starting point has to do with fundamental developments in Dutch educational policy.

Conditions for the improving amount of quality
It is obvious that teachers play a key role in actual educational innovation. Consequently teacher training colleges which are primarily responsible for initial and in-service training, should be involved in plans for the implementation of the European Dimension in an early stage. The limits and possibilities of the individual teacher, and thus of classroom practice, should also be taken into account. However, for teacher training the document of the core curriculum must be available containing clear-cut proposals on goal, content, place and didactics, and suggestions for the incorporation in existing subjects. Such a curriculum framework could serve as a basic document, reflecting a nationwide consensus. Such a basic document could guide the development of teaching material, tests and the content of in-service training activities. This basic document should give a balanced and sound description of the various dimensions of the 'theme Europe'. This could be achieved by defining a political, an economic, a geographical and an historical dimension, to be discussed in the lessons for each subject or cluster of subjects. On no account should European education be treated as a separate school subject, but it should be integrated into the compulsory programs for existing subjects.

In order to give more and better attention to the European dimension a national plan must be developed and carried out within the formal educational system. If the responsibility is left to non-governmental organizations or the informal circuit, the effects will remain limited, since this will continue the present non-committal situation. Only centrally prescribed examination programs (= basic education and learning outcomes) can lead to large-scale educational change. This is a question of professional status. A curriculum project with expertise at its disposal in the fields of curriculum development, evaluation and training, and addressing itself to the planning of implementation activities, is likely to succeed.

Action Plan for the European dimension in the Netherlands

1. Curriculum development
   - qualitative analysis and assessment of the usability of teaching material on the European dimension;
   - analysis of the European dimension in (examination) programs for History, Geography, Economics, and Political Education;
   - development of a core curriculum for the European dimension, with learning outcomes described in terms of dimensions (subject aspects) of Geography, History, Economics, Political Education;
   - the construction of instruments for testing and experimental tests together with the core curriculum;
   - the revision of existing teaching material or the development of new exemplary material which is readily transferable and usable with existing methods.

2. Implementation
   - passing on of the core curriculum to teacher training colleges for initial and in-service training;
   - small-scale, regional in-service training centres for teachers;
   - teachers' conferences for information exchange;
   - integration into examination programs;
   - contacts with educational publishers.

Proposals for cooperation at the European level

- Curriculum development, research and training activities within individual institutions. A survey of existing expertise in Europe by means of national reports or supplementary reports on institutions in Europe with specific know-how.
- Start of small-scale European projects, in which know-how in different fields is brought together. For example curriculum development, didactics, textbook analysis, in-service training, information exchange, etc. Research into new ways of using media to support activities aimed at teachers and pupils.
- The establishment of a central European coordinating body, which not only keeps records of curricula, materials, research results, etc., but also proposes new initiatives and is familiar with the state of the art in all member countries.

In summary, the draft resolution of the ministers of Education in the European Community of May 1988 constitutes an important political impulse towards strengthening the position of the European dimension in education. In this resolution, all Member States are urged to take measures to integrate the European dimension in existing subjects such as History, Geography and the social sciences. The result of this initiative in 1992 -Europe without boundaries- should be that young people have more insight into the historical, cultural and political aspects of Europe. At the same time, the efforts of the formal educational system towards integration of the European dimension offer opportunities for more European cooperation and coordination in the field of political education.

5.2.4. Conclusions and recommendations

The extent to which an effective international component can be added to curricula and educational programs for political education strongly depends on the content, status, scale and quality of this subject. The position of political education (or civics) varies quite a bit from country to country in Europe. The same obviously goes for starting points, goals and content.
It seems as if political education, certainly in the sense of democratic political education, is not a high priority issue in everyday classroom practice. German, but also British publications suggest that the place of political education in formal documents is marginal, limited to knowledge of how the political system itself works. In the Netherlands, we are lucky that thinking about social issues is an accepted phenomenon in education and society. And that there are means of converting these basic notions into concrete plans of action.

The necessity of internationalization of political education is widely accepted in Western Europe, the USA etc. But on the other hand, the question is: who participates in this discussion and at what level? Is it only the so-called Globalists, or evangelists preaching a new gospel for education? For we are all familiar with the countermovements, who demonstrate through nationwide actions that modern man no longer knows his own world, and is hardly aware of his own historical values. More and more people in The Netherlands, for instance, claim that 'young people know more about other cultures than about their own'.
Naturally, this is a matter of finding a balance between basic knowledge about one's own, 'national' environment and larger social

units. What must be avoided at all costs is provincialism leading to cultural and political alienation. I think it is realistic to assume that widely accepted themes like the North-South issue and the introduction of the European dimension will not lead to an internationalized curriculum for political education, for this demands to interweave permanently international aspects in the subject matter.

However, particularly in The Netherlands, conditions are favourable for strengthening the international dimension in educational programs (annual plans, methods, training) by combining development education with the theme 'Europe'. In this context it is of strategic importance to establish a 'European Platform' for more systematic exchange of experience and information. Such a platform can initiate, coordinate and supply information, thus contributing significantly to the improvement of the quality of political education and the international dimension. At the RCPA/IPSA Europe. I already argued in favour of establishing such a platform and making a list of activities in order of priority.

5.2.5. Epilogue

There is always publicity on the theme 'young people and politics'. In the sixties, it was said that teenagers were rebellious, in the course of the seventies they were indifferent, and more recently, a shift towards conservatism was observed. What remained the same was the tone of concern about the political life of young people. Generally speaking, it is said that teenagers have little interest in political matters easily adopt other people's prejudices, tend to offer facile solutions to complex problems, and get most of their information about politics from television. In other words, politics is not an everyday topic of conversation for young people. Enquiries often implicitly identify politics with party politics. One may ask whether many teenagers react against politics because there is not enough possibility for other forms of political activity. Indifference need not imply a lack of all interest in politics. In this connection it is worthwhile to mention what Dutch teenagers said in a writing competition on politics: 'Politics is not something I give much thought to. I've got plenty of other things on my mind, except when the government comes up with something new about cutbacks, unemployment, and that sort of thing'. The opinion of young people on politics is not only a judgement on current politics, but also a judgement on the adult world and its own future prospects. We should always bear in mind that the youth is the target group of political compentence. So that they can make their own choices, and when and where they desire, can initiate processes of change in a democratic way.

A 16-year-old girl writes:
Politics
Are a messy mix
Everything going every which way
From drugs to economics
My father is a right-wing man
My mother prefers the socialist clan
It can bore me silly, it really can!

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5.3 Modernity and Tradition: Dilemmas of Political Education in Developing Countries

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5.3.1. Introduction

The differences between modern and traditional political systems have continued to be an important topic of study for political scientists. However, recent studies have tended to de-emphasize the earlier contention that traditional values and modernity are incompatible. Political developments, including changes in political systems, have made it clear that modernity and tradition are not always entirely distinct. In developing countries the educational system is a major agency in achieving the consensus so urgently needed. Political education in particular is an important tool of integration and mobilization. Particularly in recent years, some developing countries have totally rejected western values and ideas of modernity as being applicable to their own societies. Instead, traditional mores and values have been asserted as dynamic and integrative elements of political education. The differences in the historical, political and social structures of the developing countries make it difficult, to find a common explanatory reason for the dilemmas of modernity and tradition in political education. However, this paper attempts to give some answers as to why especially in some developing countries a return to tradition has replaced the quest for modernity, and has been reintroduced as the principal dynamic element necessary for the spiritual and material advancement of these societies. These developments have made education a more contentious political issue than was the case in the past.

5.3.2. Political culture, political education and developing countries

As Ward and Rustow (1964:12) contend, one of the great events of the twentieth century is the emergence or re-emergence of former colonial societies and their claims for more independent roles in the world. Both these authors point out that in order to adequately assess and compare these societies, it is indispensable to distinguish between factors that are mostly or entirely beyond the control of a society's leaders and factors that are amenable to conscious choice and direction. The first category includes a country, its cultural heritage and its international environment throughout the various stages of the modernization process; the second includes its political institutions and a wide range of patterns of political and social organization!

In those developing societies which first went through a colonial period one of the dilemmas regarding political education is in relation to existing power structures. Education in these societies is both under the influence of the power structure established after independence and the remnants of the power structure from the colonial

era. These two may sometimes be at odds or complementary. In countries such as Senegal a thorough knowledge of French seems to be a primary requirement for advancement in the social hierarchy. Thus, while asserting their national independence the educated Senegalese still have to learn and use, among other things, the language of the former colonial power. Hence, political education in countries like Senegal, India and Nigeria cannot neglect or reject now and in the foreseeable future the cultural impact of the formerly imperial power. On the other hand, developing countries in South America do not, by and large, challenge the cultural heritage of Spain or Portugal. These cultures have become part of those societies; thereby, political education is an instrument of endorsement rather than a challenge of the Spanish and Portuguese heritage.

The tension between modern and traditional politics is a prevalent state of affairs in most developing countries. However, even the political culture of most developed societies is usually a blend of modern and traditional elements. But unlike most developing countries, in modern democratic societies there is generally a consensus on the major principle which constitutes the basis of the political system. Among the developing societies the case of Turkey is rather unique because Turkey never became a colony. And in the history of the country, political and cultural change was always directed by indigenous elites. Furthermore, the dialectic of colonial conquest and liberation, which in reality breaks historical continuity in most developing societies is absent in the case of Turkey. Thus, there is an uninterrupted chain that links the Kemalists to the Young Turks, to the men of Tanzimat and to the classical Ottoman Empire the sponsors of modernity with the founders of tradition in the thirteenth century (Rustow, 1965:172). Thus, while Rustow claims that Turkish culture partakes of both modern and traditional elements and points out the advent of national consciousness as the most important effect of modernization, Eisenstadt (1978:233) maintains an opposite view, especially in the case of Kemalist Turkey. Eisenstadt says: 'The Kemalist Revolution resulted in a pattern of transformation distinct from that found in other revolutionary societies. It was connected first of all with a shift in the bases of political legitimation and the symbols of the political community, together with the redefinition of the boundaries of the collectivity. Redefinition of the political community took place in a unique way. Society withdrew from the Islamic framework into that of the newly defined Turkish nation. While this process appears similar to the path followed by the European nationstates, it in fact involved the negation of a universal framework, Islam which was not the case in Europe'. And as Kazamias (1966:255) notes: 'In embarking upon the task of building a new nation, Atatürk and his associates conceived of education as the most important foundation. In the emerging ideology of Atatürkism, education was inextricably bound up with political, economic and cultural independence and with breaking the shackles of traditional beliefs and outlooks; it was the means of nourishing national aspirations, creating the consensus necessary to sustain a free, national state, training new Turkish leaders, and paving the way towards a dynamic and modern society. Knowledge and science were regarded as power and as the leverage in transforming and uplifting the entire society'.

Hence, the Kemalists made a concerted effort to abolish the main elements of traditional culture. For example, religion was not used as an instrument to mobilize the masses in Turkey as in the case in countries such as Libya, Iran and Pakistan.

The Kemalist idea of a national community opposed the Islamic

commitment to the religious state. Thus, the Kemalists looked upon education as a means of the total transformation of culture, whereas, for example, in contemporary Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia education is used as a means of preserving traditional culture. As Muzrui (1984:408) observes: 'The Atatürk reforms in Turkey... started from the premise that neither the state nor the economy could effectively be modernized unless Turkish culture itself was modernized. The soul of the nation had to be converted to a new allegiance before the limbs of the nation could perform their tasks effectively... Society was an integrated phenomenon and no easy distinction could be made between culture and economy, between the state and the collective soul'. Commitment to change, the reality of nationhood and nationalism were used to mobilize the masses in Kemalist Turkey; whereas, in countries such as Iran statusquo and/or radical interpretation of traditional values are used as the means to mobilize the masses. However, the advent of competitive politics in Turkey since 1946 has led to the re-emergence of traditional groups and values on the Turkish political scene. And since the September 12, 1980, military intervention and the framing of the constitution of 1982 traditionalist behaviour and values have tended to increasingly dominate Turkish political life. This situation has been augmented by the reality of a succession of conservative governments. Hence in contemporary Turkey, education as well as political education are being channelled in the direction of upholding traditional values and mores. This situation constitutes one of the main areas of tension between the traditionalist and modernist forces in Turkey and is the principal cause of the dilemmas in political education.

Pye (1965:19) notes the continuing importance of tradition in giving a sense of uniqueness and meaning to the individual political cultures and emphasizes the fact that 'political development is not a process in which there is simply a decline of traditional modes of behavior and rise of nationality and impersonal efficiency. Politics involves the expansion of the collective values of people, feelings of people about their social and group identities, and above all also the tests of loyalty and commitment'. Pye's contention with regard to tradition is generally very welltaken. However, in recent years political developments in certain areas of the world, such as Iran and Libya demonstrate to us that traditions are being used as replacement for modernity and at the expense of other values and commitments in such societies. In the contemporary world, to coin a phrase, we are witnessing the militancy of traditions and/or the attempt to use traditions as a militant force at the expense of other values and opinions. In countries where traditions are being used as such the aim of political education is the replacement of everything else by the traditions and mores of the dominant group. While the case of Pakistan, for example, does not render itself to such militancy, yet even in that country religion and traditional values are constantly employed by the state as elements of control over the people and as the main integrative force. A similar if not the same situation can be observed in the case of Saudi Arabia. Needless to say, force is not the sole rule employed in such a state of affairs. Obviously there are strong and widespread elements in the respective cultures of such countries as Iran and Libya. In fact, even when Nasser tried at one time to mobilize the masses around a secularist program he could not make much headway in this direction because he could not get enough support. Historically speaking, Egyptian society, politics, and culture had not been instrumental in giving rise to strong and widespread secularist sentiments and views. On the other hand, the

opposite case has been true for Turkish society. Historically, attemtps at modernization were constantly stifled by religious-traditionalist groups. Hence, ever since the nineteenth century, Turkish modernization attempts have run parallel with growing secularist interests. Moreover, the cooperation of the religious hierarchy with the forces of occupation during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) was yet another reason why Kemal Atatürk could push for his nationalist and secularist reforms. In contrast, for example, in Iran Khumeini was hailed by many Iranians as a liberator against the oppressive regime of the Shah. Furthermore, the strong and widespread religious elements in Iranian culture made the Iranian people much more receptive to religious-traditionalist policies than still is the case in Turkey. All these changes in political regimes cause dramatic changes in the nature and direction of political education in the respective developing societies.

Changes in the direction of political regimes profoundly affect political education in the so-called socialist countries as well. A case in point is China. During the Maoist period, the Chinese were subjected to an orthodox and widespread political education along Maoist lines. Since Mao's death and the liberalization of the regime the content of political education has been somewhat changed. More importantly the intensity of political education has waned and so has the anti-Western propaganda.

We can generally conclude that political education in developing countries is used mainly for two purposes: as challenge to the dominant Western culture and/or as a means of reasserting indigenous and/or national culture.

5.3.3. Human rights, modernity, and developing countries

The late Nkrumah of Ghana in an article he wrote (1961) in Foreign Affairs asserted that there are three main items on the agenda of developing countries: independence, economic development, and neutrality. One notices that political freedom is not listed among the primary problems facing these countries. It is not clear whether political freedom is dismissed as not being essential or the attainment delayed to a future date. This vagueness about the desirability of political freedom seems to be a prevalent attitude of many leaders of developing societies. Economic and technological development seem to be the dominant aim of these countries and their leaders.

Several thinkers from developing societies, especially those from Africa, challenge 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights' as being a Western document[1]. They claim that when this document was prepared the United Nations had a limited membership since many nations had not yet attained their independence. They further claim that some rights, which these societies consider important are not included in the document. All these criticisms are very well taken if it were not for the occasional relativistic approach which seems to overshadow some of their views. The dilemma here is the following: In the name of a more 'suitable' human rights document, some thinkers from developing societies fall into the danger of upholding cultural relativism, which in itself can instigate the very prejudices which these societies would like to see eliminated: 'the white man's burden' approach of Rudyard Kipling and others was a matter of cultural relativism. It

involved the supremacy of Western culture over those of others. Moreover, the exponents of cultural relativism in developing countries make the same mistakes as some of the earlier colonial powers. For, if we are going to talk about the rights of the Senegalese, Nigerians, Indians, Englishmen, and Frenchmen we are not going to get anywhere. Thus, one of the most important dilemmas some of these developing societies face, lies in their understanding of human rights. If developing societies cannot come to an agreement on the matter of the universality of human rights, then it is not possible to do something concrete about the injustices in this field. Relativism and universality of human rights are not compatible.

While the above-mentioned arguments involve partial criticism of 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights', we have the case of Iran, which totally rejects the validity of this document as being Western and superfluous. Iran believes in the values of Islam and in the rights as given by the sacred law of the Koran. Hence, this is a case of supremacy of Islamic values over that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The above-mentioned cases point out some of the dilemmas regarding human rights in developing societies with repercussions for education in general and political education in particular.

Ali Mazrui (1984: 408-410) observes that there is considerable consensus that equality is one of the ends of modernization. For example, the modernization of Japan after the Meiji Restoration was not based on equality. On the contrary, Meiji Japan mobilized deference and hierarchy as means towards modernization. Thus, patriarchy in the family, deference towards privileged classes, and loyalty to the emperor were mobilized behind the process of societal transformation. As a result of all these, obedience became the basis of workshop discipline, deference became the basis of economic leadership, hierarchy became the foundation of industrial organization. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was too egalitarian and not elitist enough. His reforms aimed at narrowing the gap between the city and the countryside, between the upper and lower classes, between Turkish and ethnic minorities, between men and women, between the rulers and the ruled. In short, Kemalist populism was too egalitarian to serve the purposes of Meiji transformation.

The above-mentioned analysis leads Mazrui to the conclusion that Kemal Atatürk was a moralist prematurely and that he sought moral perfection, simultaneously with material modernized achievement. If the material perspective is deemed more important then this could be considered Atatürk's undoing. Mazrui contends further that judging between the legacy of Atatürk and the record of Meiji Japan, Africa has to make a choice. Pointing out that although there are many reasons why Turkey has not matched Japan industrially, there is ample evidence that Turkey outstripped Japan morally in the Atatürk period. In fact, what Mazrui wants the African and other Third World modernizers to face and ponder is the following: to weigh the imperative of material change against the dictates of a higher global ethic.

Needless to say, the type of response to Western culture has had its implications for education. For example, in the case of Kemalist Turkey this has involved the application of radical reforms in the educational field, which involved the processes of nationalization,

secularization, and westernization. On the other hand, in the case of Japan this has involved the modernization of the educational system, while remaining firm about the preservation of Japanese mores, traditions and values. Mazrui (1984:403) is right when he points out that: 'Ultimately modernization requires responsiveness to more than Western civilization. Neither Turkey with the Atatürk legacy nor Japan in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration has ever been able to go beyond responsiveness to Western culture as an additive to what has already been accumulated indigeneously'. However, Mazrui forgets to mention that in the contemporary world several developing countries such as Iran and Libya want and are bent on proving that it is well possible to be a developed Islamic state without becoming westernized. In fact, they shun at using the modern world for its western, Christian underpinnings.

As the above-mentioned arguments point out succinctly that even in the case of dilemmas they face with regard to development and education, there is not a uniform pattern among the developing countries. Some of these countries want a Western type of modern education, others opt for a national as well as modern educational system, and still others reject the West totally and with renewed vigor assert the superiority of their own cultural and educational values over those of the West.

5.3.4. The state, the individual, and the developing countries

Another area in which there are dilemmas with repercussions for political education lies in the field of attitudes toward the state. For example, in a country like Nigeria political education in the direction of enhancing dedication to the state is hampered by strong tribal affiliations. Just the opposite is true in the case of Turkey. Turkey has a strong state tradition. Observing this fact Andrew Mango (1977:265) writes: 'Experience in statecraft, respect for the state, importance of the state in Turkish culture, have all been specific steadying factors in the history of the Turkish Republic, endowing it with a degree of political gravitas, absent from most new countries'. On the other hand, some Turkish and Western thinkers take the opposite view and claim that the strong state tradition in Turkey and the ensuing bureaucratic centralization are negative in Turkish political culture, because they stifle the initiative in provincial areas. However, the upholders of the strong state tradition claim that increasing local power will slow down development and retard social change as the remnants of feudal order are widespread in the countryside. The pros and cons of this issue influence and shape the course of political life, hence of political education in Turkey. Since the 1950's the local notables have increasingly been making a headway in Turkish politics. The countryside is not yet adequately modernized and the voting process is strongly influenced by landowners who aim to maintain the statusquo of feudal relations. In short, the countryside has not yet come of age in Turkey. Hence, while the experience of the Western countries such as England speaks in favour of strong local government and decentralization as positive factors for democracy, the Turkish experience has largely been in the direction of not sufficiently utilizing local energies and potential. The state has been the principal agency of change, of modernization, whereas the countryside and small towns have been, by and large, the centers of resistance to change, due to the prevailing feudal relations there, and/or ignorance and lack of political awakening of the peasants. While this state of affairs has largely been true for

most of the years of the Turkish Republic, in recent years there seems to have been a growing movement in support of decentralization along the lines of grass roots or democracy argument.

The influence of Kemalism on the political culture of Turkey had gained new momentum with the Republican People's Party's reorientation towards a left-of-center, social democratic course. The Republican People's Party, which had been the spokesman for the center for years, now began to support the demands of the periphery. The impact of Kemalism in the country as a dynamic force for social transformation remained still strong among certain circles. But the reality of revolution from above of the Kemalist era now changed to the necessity of preparing the background for the revolution from below. Since the mid-1960's this reorientation of the Republican People's Party to overcome the gap between the center and the periphery and between the educated elite and the masses was in the process of overcoming the former split between the Kemalists and the masses. However, this transformation of Kemalism into a social-democratic program was stopped by the military intervention of September 12, 1980. The army intervened in 1980 because since the late 1960's the Turkish state was virtually falling apart under the influence of widespread anarchy and violence. The Constitution of 1982 emphasized the rights of the state over those of the individual as well as the moral and ethical values of Turkish culture. Nonetheless, the arguments and tensions over centralization versus decentralization do continue in Turkey and do create dilemmas in political education (Kili, 1987:221-239).

The above-mentioned dilemmas are further enhanced by the political frictions over secularism. The Turkish state is secular; whereas the same cannot be said of much of Turkish society. Some who support decentralization do so for perpetuating more freely their religious views in the local areas. In short, in Turkey one of the major dilemmas of political education lies in the area of secularism versus religious revivalism.

In Iran, the very opposite situation exists as compared with Turkey. The state of Iran is a religious state and the direction of political education is along religious lines. It is the minority religions and sects in Iran which support secularism in order to resist the policies perpetuated in the interest of the dominant religion.

What type of an individual is envisaged by political education in the respective developing countries? The spectrum is very large and varied. For example, in the case of Iran the best individual is the one who is most religious and obedient to the will of God. In those countries where personality cult is widespread such as Libya, political education is channelled toward exalting the various virtues of the leader and not the individual. On the other hand, in the case of Atatürk's Turkey, Karpat (1959:54) maintains that: 'The new individual whom the Republican regime wanted to bring out was a rationalist, anti-clerical person approaching all matters intellectually, objectively! Science, scientific approach constituted the essence of Kemalist policies. However, the revival of Islam and later the emergence of Marxist and other extreme left-wing groups brought largely to an end the consensus that had existed in the Kemalist era. With the depoliticization of Marxist groups and the general control exercised over even the more moderate leftist forces in Turkey since the military intervention of 1980, Islamic revivalism has reached a level not witnessed ever since the establishment of the Republic in 1923.

The present resurgence of religiosity in Turkey reacts to the rationalism of Kemalism on the ground that truth is in the pages of the Koran. And political education in contemporary Turkey is moving into the direction of endorsing traditions, Islamic views, and is in general critical -if not always overtly-, of the secularist-nationalist-rationalist ethos of the Kemalist era. Thus, although economic individualism is highly supported by the present Özal government, we do not witness a concommitant support of political individualism. This is in itself a contradiction with ramifications and repercussions for political education in Turkey.

While we are all aware of the potency of education in creating the attitudes and values indispensable for national development, it is important to realize that in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan, these values are not in the direction of enhancing national values but more so communal values, since Islam, the main political force in these countries, negates rationality, national structures and individualism, Islam emphasizes ümmetçilik (The principle of living within a religious community). So religion is the integrative force. The importance of the state is secondary to that of religion. The state and the individual are both in the service of Islam.

In developing countries the state, by and large, tends to control both society and the individual. Hence, political education does not generally aim at inculcating in the minds of the citizens a sense of individualism but more so a sense of obedience to the dictates of those who control the state.

5.3.5. Conclusion

Many developing countries want to be modern without being Western. In former colonial countries political education serves the function of political awakening, whereby former subjects become committed citizens. However, mass participation in politics is an integral part of the democratic process. One of the outstanding characteristics of a modern society is its ability to mobilize the efforts of the large majority of its citizens. On the other hand, traditional societies are, among other things characterized by their inability to effectively mobilize masses. In such societies the decisions with regard to governmental policies, including those which concern education are taken by the leader or those in power. In many of these societies the people, by and large, are not part of the decision-making processes. They are usually bystanders and not active participants in influencing policies. Hence, the leader and his group or party have a much freer hand in manipulating the situation, including the nature, goal, and direction of political education.

In every country political education is political. But in the more advanced democratic states this education can be criticized and those who differ with the direction of education can have some say or influence. But in most developing societies education is an agency for inculcating in the mind of the masses the values, the whimsies, and the convictions of the leaders. Hence, those who are outside the dominant group have usually no effective regular channel through which they can influence these policies. Leaders come and go and educational policies change abruptly and/or vacillate between different values. One of the major dramas and dilemmas of education in developing societies is that there is no real continuity in educational policies.

Almost all policies depend on whichever party or leader is in power at the moment. These vacillations can be observed even in the case of Turkey which has enjoyed a long history of statehood. Despite that since the advent of a multi-party regime in the country the plight of education has depended very much on the beliefs and convictions of the party in power and its political leaders.

There are, of course, factors other than those mentioned above which lead to the dilemmas in education as well as political education. For example, the successful implementation of a westernized education especially in countries with an Islamic background such as Egypt and Turkey is replete with contradictions. Although both of these countries share the Ottoman past, the difficulties and the irrationalities, the dilemmas they confront in education are prompted not only by the internal dynamics in the respective countries, but also by the reality of Islamic heritage.

The results of recent research have, by and large, tended to dispel the earlier assumption that modernity is the sole dynamic factor introduced into the so-called static traditional societies. A case in point is contemporary Iran where traditional mores and values are being used both as dynamic and integrative elements of political education, and also a challenge to Western civilization. On the other hand, in such countries as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan traditions are still being used for the preservation of the status quo. In contemporary Turkey, there is a decided departure from the radical, secularist, nationalist approach to education. Religion has once again become an important tool of integration and mobilization. This situation is a major instigator of the dilemmas in political education as well as constituting the source of tensions between the protagonists of the Kemalist legacy and the upholders of tradition.

The dilemmas of political education in developing countries are prompted mainly by three basic and sometimes contradictory factors and situations: The crisis of modernization, the historical, political, social and cultural background of the respective societies, and the nature and quality of leadership.

5.3.6. Note

1. See for example the Proceedings of the International Interdisciplinary Conference on 'The Anthropological, Social and Juridical Bases of Human Rights', sponsored by UNESCO and the International Centre of Sociological, Penal and Penitentiary Research Studies, Giardini Naxos, Messina, Italy, 9 - 12 December 1978, for a similar assessment of the human rights question by the representatives of the developing countries.

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5.4 The De-Legitimation of political Education in Britain: A working Paper

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5.4.1. Introduction

This paper explores the recent history of political education in Britain and draws the conclusion that reasons for its failure to develop successfully in the secondary school curriculum lay more in its loss of legitimacy than through the traditionally cited barriers to its expansion. Those barriers, the 'lack of tradition; lack of teachers professionally committed to this field of work; a belief that the study of politics can only be an adult activity; and fear of indoctrination'[1] were formidable enough, but it is argued here that the principal reason for the failure of the political education movement sprung from the changes in political values which shaped education policy from 1979 onwards and which resulted in political educators being outflanked by their opponents. Critical to this situation was (i) the decline in political socialization research and the consequent loss of 'legitimacy' which this had bestowed on political education, and (ii) the movement of the political education debate from initiators and participants in the scholastic, academic and government departmental realm to participants in the party political and ideological realm.

5.4.2. The development of political education in britain

What constitutes political education in the context of the school is a matter of contention amongst educationalists. In this paper I am not referring to the political messages absorbed by pupils from the 'hidden curriculum', but to the deliberate and structured process through which knowledge, attitudes and skills that contribute to the potential of students to lead fuller political lives in adulthood. Within the 'visible' curriculum many different forms of political education exist alongside one another. It has become customary to draw a major distinction between the teaching of politics as an academic discipline to a minority of pupils in preparation for examination by external bodies (the GCSE and GCE examination boards) and the provision of a political education which is universally applied, non-examined, more concerned with political attitudes and skills than with knowledge of politics, and which may be taught through traditional subjects as well as a subject in its own right. Teaching politics is thus a narrow form of political education, but occasionally in the short-hand of the political education debate 'teaching politics' and 'political education' are referred to as separate entities.

Political education in Britain dates back to late Victorian times when the emphasis was very much on the preparation of pupils for future roles of passive citizenship. Interest in the subject revived in

response to the rise of European dictatorships and their accompanying ideologies, resulting in the founding of the Association for Education in Citizenship in 1934[2]. Although this pressure group was able to recruit the support of notable politicians and intellectuals, its goals were never achieved and final defeat came in the exclusion of its programme from the Norwoord Report of 1943 which was to shape educational provision in the post-war decades.

This paper is concerned with the 'second wave' of interest in political education this century, which was triggered by a letter published in The Guardian from Derek Heater 'deploring the state of political education in Britain' and recommending the 'establishment of a professional association to provide a service for political studies...'.[3]
Heater noted that political education had remained a neglected area of teaching during the two decades from the late 1940's to the late 1960's. In the way that it was absent from the Norwood Report so too it was largely ignored by the influential Crowther Report (1959) and Newsom Report (1963), both of which focused on the education of secondary school pupils. Responses to The Guardian letter led to a meeting of interested individuals in 1969 which resulted in the establishment of the Politics Association. That year Heater published a book, The Teaching of Politics, which also stimulated and revived interest in the area of political education.[4]

A major advance in the development of political education came with the establishment of the Programme for Political Education (PPE), a three year project which ran from 1974-77 in association with the Hansard Society and Politics Association and was funded by the Nuffield Foundation. The central purpose of PPE was the development of a political education curriculum in terms of providing a theoretical framework; its working papers were published in Teaching Politics as the project proceeded with the publication of the final report[5] following close on conclusion of the Hansard Society's survey of political awareness amongst school leavers.[6] The survey findings revealed mass political ignorance and misunderstanding amongst pupils, the most remarkable of which being the 44% who believed that the IRA was a Protestant organization set up to prevent Ulster being united with the South. PPE, with its key concept of 'political literacy' promised a timely remedy for this unhealthy state of British youth. PPE proposed that politics should be approached through 'issues' rather than through 'institutions'; that political activity be defined widely to include the 'politics of everyday life' rather than being associated exclusively with the formal institutions of government; and that 'political literacy' should be skills-based rather than knowledge-based. The problems of bias and indoctrination, which concerned some but by no means all political educators, could be circumvented it was argued through underpinning the whole political education process by specific 'procedural values', namely freedom, toleration, fairness, respect for the truth and respect for reasoning.[7]

Participants in the Programme for Political Education had addressed principally the conceptual problems associated with political education. Far less substantial were ideas on how political education might be accomplished at the classroom level and practically non-existent were teaching materials which might support the whole venture. Nevertheless the exercise represented a level of maturity in thinking about political education that had never been reached previously.

The topic of political education was by the mid-seventies appearing on the agenda of central educational bodies. A discussion paper from the Schools Council, an education quango, appeared in 1975 in which it was argued that 'pupils may reasonably expect to receive a political education appropriate to participation in the life of a democratic society'.[8] And what was to be the first of an authoritative series of endorsements of political education came in a discussion paper from two HMI's, John Slater and Roger Hennessey, on 'Political Competence' in a document on the 11-16 curriculum. They argued:

> 'Although the idea of political education is suspect to many people, there are nevertheless compelling reasons for asserting its importance in the 11-16 curriculum... The aim is to give pupils knowledge and tools for informed and responsible political participation... Political education might also do something to restore a respect for political activity and attitudes and rescue them from the worrying trend of current cynicism about the place of politics in society.'[9]

Two DES documents published in 1980 which reinforced points made by the HMI's; A Framework for the School Curriculum specifically included references to the 'social and political' areas of experience, recognised increasing support for the view that political education should be a clearly definable element in the curriculum, and regretted the apparent reluctance of some schools and local education authorities to accept the need to provide effective political education. In A View of the Curriculum a large step was taken in recognizing the political impact of the hidden curriculum on pupils, a theme touched on by the HMI's in the conclusion of their paper.[10]

The decade of the 1970's was marked by a relative abundance of texts concerned one way or another with the development of political education; two journals were established (one of them was Dutch in origin but published in English); numerous radio and television programmes were broadcast with the intention of providing classroom stimulus material; a considerable number of local education authorities had appointed advisers with special responsibility for political education; the University of London and University of Birmingham had each appointed a lecturer in political education; and two institute-like bodies were established at the London University (The Curriculum Review Unit) and York University (The Political Education Research Unit) with specific interests in political education. In short, political educators could claim with justification that their concern was now seen as a legitimate classroom activity.

What could have provided the final victory for the political education movement came in the form of a DES funded study of political education provision in schools. The Curriculum Review Unit conducted a 10 per cent national survey and reported that 71 per cent of schools claimed to give 'indirect provision' of political education through traditional subjects like history, 22 per cent provided exclusive courses, 30 per cent provided modular provision, and 21 per cent had no provision (the total exceeds 100 per cent since some schools offered more than one form of provision).[11] Political educators did not celebrate the fact that four out of five schools now provided political education because, to put it bluntly, they did not believe it to be true. Concerns were expressed over the survey methodology whereby it was respondents who defined what was meant by 'political education', particularly pertinent to the category of 'indirect

provision'. Much of the survey appeared to be measuring the frequence of what might be best described as 'some political education' rather than 'a political education'. Whereas the latter is planned, coordinated and comprehensive process, the former tends to be incidental, partial and presumed to have occurred.

Ian Lister's assessment of the state of political education was far more sombre than that contained in the CRU survey. He stated:

> 'The present situation of political education in schools in Great Britain can be summarized thus: legitimation has been achieved, implementation is limited, uneven in quality, and patchy in geographical distribution; effective political literacy education in schools is still very hard to find. Thus, ten years after the launching of The National Programme for Political Education we still need to devise a viable way ahead for political education in the schools.'[12]

By the early 1980's, then, political education remained poised to make a significant advance in terms of implementation. How and why did that anticipated advance turn into an actual retreat?

The Decline of Political Education

A number of assessments of the state of political education in the 1980's included accounts of its decline. In 1985 a personal survey by Alan Reid included a number of interviews with political educators located at different points in the education system. Alex Porter, the lecturer in political education at London University, noted an upsurge of interest in political education although he agreed that practice remained in 'dynamic equilibrium at a low level' whilst Tom Brennam, ex-chairman of the Politics Association, believed that 'future growth will be slow and patchy'.[13] HMI John Slater struck a more positive note, perceiving that political education was 'moving in a rather untidy, disorganized and disparate way, in the direction of political literacy'. My comments recorded a more sombre assessment, arguing that the wider political climate did not favour political education which 'only flourishes in liberal times. It will come back onto the agenda. At the moment, it is in a trough and it is a case of keeping heads down and sticking in the trenches. The time is not right yet for advances.'[14] Reid concluded that 'political education in England is at the cross-roads... (it) will either vanish from the curriculum or continue to concomitant addiction to uninspiring pedagogy so despised by the reform movement of the 70's'. He recommended a closer association between the political educators of the 1970's and the new related movements of the 1980's, such as peace education. Not only would 'a broad front containing a number of simular interest... exercise more political clout than multifarious individual bodies' but also 'political educators can learn much from the new movements whose concentration has been on classroom process'.[15] His proposal that political education could be both reinvigorated and extended through being part of a broad front reflected a lack of awareness of the impact of the wider political environment on such a development. As we shall see, the way in which new movements were perceived through politically ascendant ideologies and the fact that political education was seen to embrace such movements placed the subject in a dangerous situation which carried the risk of its extinction.

A second deliberation of the contemporary state of political education was contained in Political Education in Britain, a work edited by Clive Harber, the political education lecturer at the University of

Birmingham. The book was intended to assess the developments in the field in the twenty years since Derek Heater's book was published. There were areas containing optimistic reports on new opportunities and advances; notably in politics teaching at advanced level, youth work, and in vocational sub-degree courses.[16] But on political education of 14-16 year olds in school there was little to celebrate. Alex Porter's assessment struck an even more cheerless note on this occasion, 'political education is now, more than ever, a 'low status, high risk' area of the curriculum'[17] he observed.

The low status and high risks attached to political education were reflections of its de-legitimation, which took place in a discordant, ambivalent, opaque and at times politically clumsy manner. Those involved, notably politicians, frequently tailored their words to suit particular audiences with the consequence that the pattern of falling status and increasing risks became clear only with the course of time.

Political education in the school curriculum was legitimated under the patronage of Shirley Williams, sometimes referred to as the 'Godmother of Political Education', when Secretary of State for Education. Its decline was presided over in great part by Sir Keith Joseph during his term at the DES. In 1975 when still on the Opposition benches Sir Keith adressed the Politics Association Annual Conference, an act sometimes mistakenly interpreted as his personal endorsement of political education. Whilst saying he admired what was trying to be done, he raised doubts regarding both the feasibility and desirability of the exercise. On the PPE documents then available he commented:

> 'I cannot forbear to point out that the fashionable collectivist bias of our time creeps into what are admittedly only draft documents... There is an implicit stress on government as the main source of well-being. One does not have to be a minimalist like Nozick or Buchanan to be aware that governments, particularly perhaps in this country, have tended to do much of it badly... There is another coherent, indeed to my mind, magisterial analysis, that lays proper stress on the indispensable duties of government but argues that mankind is apt to be more fulfilled within a framework that allows for other factors -such as duty, self-help, responsibility, self-interest, altruism- that are not even listed in the catalogue of fundamentals that I have seen.'[18]

He continued in his address to raise questions about the appropriateness of PPE's 'issues' approach to politics, as well as its content which he would favour being based solidly on the discipline of economics. He would prefer political literacy to be underpinned by a catalogue of contents which might include the creation of wealth, the function of profits, supply and demand, output, over-manning, and at one point conceded that perhaps he 'should be talking to the Economics Association' rather than the Politics Association.

Under the Thatcher administration the DES adopted an openly hostile attitude towards political education; prompted by falling school rolls, the DES stated that recruits to teacher training should come only from graduates with degrees relevant to the primary and secondary school curriculum. Individual cases were reported in the press of applicants being refused places because their degrees were in sociology and politics.[19] At the same time financial support for a number of projects, including a political education project involving eleven schools, was dropped when the Schools Council was wound up although support was maintained for those projects in favoured areas.

The further marginalisation was evident in the negotiations which led to the construction of a national core curriculum. Sir Keith encouraged the inclusion of history and, as signalled in his earlier address to the Politics Association, economics but not politics. A major consultation document from the DES, The National Curriculum 5-16 (the 'Red Book') expressed the principal goal of constructing a curriculum which would equip pupils 'with the knowledge, skills and understanding that they need for adult life and employment.'[20] Surprisingly, perhaps, political education was not recognised as central to this end. The first priority in the proposed core was maths, English and science with foundation subjects of a modern foreign language, technology, history, geography, art/music and physical education which together would occupy around 80 per cent of the timetable. It was also proposed that certain themes, the examples cited were health education and information technology, 'should be taught through the foundation subjects, so that they can be accommodated within the curriculum but without crowding out essential subjects.'[21]

Responses to the 'Red Book' from the professional bodies elicited replies from the DES which are open to considerable interpretation. On the one hand they could have represented the efforts of 'friends of political education' who were doing their best under changed and hostile circumstances or, on the other hand they could have represented incrementalism with elements of lip-service to mollify interested parties who were going to lose out eventually. I quote two examples for information. A reply from an Education Minister to the Politics Association on the role of political education pointed out that the core subjects 'will not take up all the time available. There will also be an opportunity for pupils to study other important subjects such as political education' (my emphasis). It also stated that 'In addition to those non-foundation subjects which are taught separately, there are a number of topics such as political education which can be taught and experienced through other timetabled subjects and may benefit from such treatment.'[22]

A reply to the Joint Forum of Academic and Teaching Associations in the Social Sciences raised the possibility of including political education as a cross curricula theme but cited economics as the priority in this respect:

> 'There are many topics such as political and social studies which are not listed among the foundation subjects but which are important enough to find a place at some point in the educational experience of some or all of our children between 5 and 16.
> Elements of these topics are likely to feature within the teaching of foundation subjects and can make a unique contribution to some of them. The Governement is particularly concerned, for example, that the national curriculum will promote economic awareness.'[23]

Thus whilst political education was officially cited as 'important' in correspondence it failed to win an explicit reference in the major discussion document. Furthermore, the possible role for political education as a cross-curricula theme placed it in a vulnerable position as some political educators had argued. In 1980 Tom Brennan's statement for the Politics Association expressed:

> 'Some reservations about the approach to political education through traditional subjects as a general strategy. Such an approach, we

believe, may militate against other desirable and legitimate aims within the subject concerned and may well result in a failure to devote attention systematically to the requirements of political education.'[24]

Even in conjunction with cognate subjects in the humanities and social sciences 'where social, economic, and political concepts are inter-related' the statement was cautious about subject integration:

'It is... important, however, that political education is not merged into a wider programme of inter-disciplinary of 'integrated' study to the extent that it loses its identity. The political education component within the core curriculum must retain a clear focus in the minds of teachers and pupils alike.'[25]

During the protracted emergence of the national curriculum political educators came to generally accept that their cause was a lost one. Their second worst fears regarding political education were being realized -the worst being explicit and outright rejection- with the subject suffering all the disadvantages mentioned above that come with 'indirect provision'. Political educators had become increasingly aware that a state of political literacy was the end product of a coordinated set of activities rather than the product of change associated with 'integration' and 'indirect provision'. Even if 'some political education' could be diffused through the core curriculum, 'political literacy' seems an unlikely outcome of its presence.

The most explicit episode regarding political education's loss of legitimacy came with the actions of the Manpower Services Commission in 1982. The MSC is a quango, an arm of indirect government used increasingly by the Thatcher governments to bypass local authorities, with responsibility to oversee the training of young people on job opportunity schemes. A letter to colleges participating in MSC schemes stated:

'I am writing to you and other local trainers who are running courses as part of the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) to remind you that political and related activities are not permitted within YOP... Inclusion in the course of political and related activities could be regarded as a breach of your agreement with the MSC and could result in the immediate closure of the course.'[26]

This directive received considerable attention in the education press and attracted the interest of a Parliamentary Select Committee. When answering the Select Committee the chairman of the MSC conceded that such intervention would not take place but, of course, for political education the damage had been done.

By the late eighties political educators were rethinking their strategy for the development of political education, for clearly PPE had failed both in widespread penetration of the school curriculum and in explicit inclusion in the national core curriculum. Content had developed and fragmented into specific interests such as peace studies, black studies, world studies and personal and social education, which presented both opportunities and threats. The mood, reflecting an element of desparation, was that political education might advance 'on the coat tails' of these other areas.[27] But with this the political education movement was leaving the relatively safe confines of PPE and entering more politically dangerous territory in its drive for popular recognition.

5.4.3. Political education and political socialisation

The links between the work of political scientists engaged in socialisation research and campaigning political educators were important. In their different ways both were concerned with the development of political orientations in the setting of the school. Political educators would frequently cite political socialisation research findings in support of a particular case or as reasons for exploring a particular avenue. For example, those educators interested in the possibility of young children handling political material in the classroom used the linkage with socialisation research to support their radical position of fusing the 'primacy' principle with 'primary' schooling.[28]

Most of the research in the area of political socialisation was, of course, American in origin but that part of it concerned with the agency of the school did find a place in some British-based projects. Indeed, it must not be forgotten that a number of American projects involved British schoolchildren. As might be expected, however, when many researchers were working simultaneously and independently in the field the findings and conclusions did not always match up. But despite contested results there did emerge a dominant or conventional wisdom on the political socialisation process in schools.[29]

Of the numerous linkages that came to exist between socialisation research and political education two were of particular significance. The first -the 'dog that barked'- took the form of essentially sponsored research into the levels of political knowledge amongst young adolescents. The findings revealed a generally low level of political understanding -dangerously low it was argued to sustain democracy in good health- and gave credence to those who wished to remedy the situation through the introduction of political education.[30] The second important linkage was the 'dog that never barked' and concerned the fears held by some that political education might open the door to political bias in the classroom or even, at its worst, political indoctrination. Such fears, however, were not supported by research findings. Neither bias nor indoctrination were found to be problematic. The thrust of socialisation research revealed a differential pattern where 'bias' was located in the wider settings of the education system and society rather than originating from the classroom. Although the topics of bias and indoctrination were discussed by teachers, many political educators saw it as a 'bogus problem'. The PPE report devoted less than a full page to the section sub-headed 'The Fear of Bias', and during the PPE fieldwork period PERU 'was unable to find a single student who had altered his or her own political position as a result of teaching received'.[31] And political socialisation research gave no reasons for believing otherwise.

It was inevitable that the abrupt curtailment of political socialisation research would have an impact on the political education movement, which it had helped to sustain in these important ways.[32] The reduced level of research activity removed some of the stimulus for political education -the revelations of mass ignorance amongst the young for example- and reduced the authoritative academic support which was previously at hand for easing anxieties on sensitive issues such as bias and indoctrination. Without such sustenance from political socialisation political educators were put very much on the defensive.

This was seen on no issue more clearly than in the continuing public anxieties about political education and bias. It was still possible in 1980 for the problem to be dismissed, as Alex Porter did in an article titled 'Much Ado About Nothing?' Based on his own experience, he was able to record:

> 'Over the past five years or so I have had considerable contact with every category of person who might be concerned about political education. Certainly there is much mention made of the 'problem of bias' but, without exception, everyone has been at pains to deny their own anxiety and has presumed an anxiety in the minds of others. Try as one might -and I have tried- it defies detection.'[33]

Six years later the political climate in which the issue was debated had changed enough for the personal assurances of the type provided by Porter or PERU to carry little persuasive weight. Without any authoritative back-up to counter the various charges of bias that were being made against political educators, the strategy changed fundamentally from denial of the problem to coping with problem. For example, whilst still protesting that politics teachers were no more susceptible to bias than other subject teachers Porter now proceeded to devise a 'bias-detection check list' and teaching strategies for coping with bias.[34] At the same time two senior officers of the Politics Association, Bill Jones and Bernard Jones, independently produced prescriptions on avoiding bias. Bill Jones argued that 'the dangers of bias in political education clearly exist' and continued to suggest six principal guidelines for teachers to follow in order to avoid bias.[35] Bernard Jones produced a position paper for the Politics Association which provided a framework for analysis and action on the problem.[36] The mood had changed, with political educators drawn once again in a debate which they believed they had won over a decade earlier.

In 1988 there is some reason for thinking that political educators may be able to move from their defensive position to one where they seize the initiative in the bias debate and thus (once again) to remove one of the major barriers to the political education movement. In 1987 Harry McGurk edited What Next? - a document related to the young people in society project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.[37] A number of contributions reported widespread indifference to and misunderstanding of political issues among adolescents, basically updating the earlier survey by Stradling.[38] The paper from Billig and Cochrane, based on two questionnaire surveys, revealed that:

> 'One of the most striking results to emerge from comparison of the two questionnaires was the growth of support for fascist parties... if second choices are included, then the 1982 results indicated that over 30 percent were expressing some sympathy for a fascist party.'[39]

In the press conference McGurk's words had a familiar ring as the need for political education was 'born again'. He noted that 'the overwhelming majority of British youth appears to be politically illiterate' with 'overt racism endemic among white young people', and concluded that there was now 'an urgent need to... introduce political education into school.'[40]

Another revival of interest in political socialisation by Lancaster University staff, to be reported at IPSA in Washington, provides another vital linkage between the political science and political

education communities with their study which included a 'bias detection' test.[41] Their findings are vital to political educators and should enable them to refute the current wave of charges of bias and indoctrination without resort to anecdotal evidence and personal reassurances. The link between political education and political socialisation is being re-established as it completes full circle with the appearance of the movement's two 'guard dogs' - mass political ignorance' and 'absence of systematically observed classroom bias'.

5.4.4. Politics and political education

The second wave of interest in political education originated in an educational climate associated with the post-war consensus and the underpinning values of Keynes and Beveridge. Official support for political education in general and PPE in particular can now be more clearly recognized as also being largely a product of that consensus. Once the consensus weakened -some would say ended- then it was no surprise that the role of political education was re-evaluated. Of course political education could have survived such re-evaluation or, possibly, have continued to expand in some redefined form. What was not expected in 1979 was that it would become entangled in one of the most ideological domestic conflicts - the struggle between a right-wing conviction-led central government and socialist local authorities. Faced with diminishing scope for policy implementation, through the creation of new agencies to perform council functions, privatisation and contracting out, and stricter financial controls, some labout-controlled authorities developed political education as a potential weapon to counter the advance of the "Thatcher revolution'. This development took political education out of the hands of political educators and the academic community, and placed it firmly in the higher risk political arena.

Conservatism and Political Education[42]
The notion of political education for school children has been far from rejected by Conservatives; some even beyond the confines of the one-nation tradition have entertained its promotion. At the height of interest in political education during the mid-seventies the Conservative opposition spokesman for education, Norman St. John-Stevas, argued that 'We may legitimately expect from those teaching in our schools commitment to the crown and constitution' since they were 'an intrinsic part of the value system.'[43] His framework for political education, described somewhat dismissively as the '3C's' of Crown, Constitution and Conservatism may have been distant from the concept of political literacy but the significant point was that he did not reject political education as a matter of principle. Through the pages of Teaching Politics two conservative MP's gave their support to political education. Alan Haselhurst wrote that 'The case for political education in schools ought to be self-evident. It is astonishing that it is not more widely accepted' and Edward Heath, a former Conservative Prime Minister, argued that yound people had an important part to play in political life.[44] The NATO-funded European Atlantic Movement (TEAM) took a vigorous interest in the subject and, finally, conservative political thought, as expressed by Michael Oakeshott had also supported political education.

The New Right and Political Education
The economic and political liberalism of the New Right which is associated with the governments led by Mrs. Thatcher has been noted

for ambracing various traditions and containing numerous contradictions. To cite one example only, King has pointed out how the liberal foundations of the New Right emphasise the desirability of the minimal state whereas Conservative foundations require a strong state to enforce political decisions.[45] Within such ambiguity there seems considerable scope to develop a New Right case for political education. Indeed for such a vigorous ideological school, it is surprising that the nature and purpose of political education has not been redefined in the cause of preparing pupils for life in the brave New Right world. The preparation of pupils, or young individuals, to play future roles in the political market place through providing them with at least the minimum level of skills necessary for survival in adulthood seems consistent with New Right thinking. New generations of citizens educated away from the dependency culture based on welfare provision into roles of greater responsibility for private provision would seem an attractive proposal to the New Right.

Additionally, it can be argued that political education has the potential of preparing individuals for situations in which they can exercise greater degrees of choice, thereby strengthening the market and even extending market-like forces to areas normally subject to state decisions. A situation I have referred to elsewhere helps to illustrate the latter point, and it involved a report from a Sunday Telegraph journalist noting that Danish pupils were demanding a return to a more formal education system rather than the progressive education they were receiving.[46] He applauded them for favouring traditional education but failed to recognise the merit of a system which enabled the pupils to articulate and lobby for their preference. Whilst it cannot be expected that the New Right would support the progressive methods which existed in this example, it might be expected to support more ideologically acceptable methods which facilitated similar opportunities for the exercise of greater choice in a state regulated area.

But no such case for any form of explicit political education has been fashioned on New Right principles. An early warning of rejection lay in John Vincent's aggressive review of the PPE report in which he touched on the New Right yardstick.[47] He attacked the sloppiness of the PPE report's presentation -typographical errors and actual spelling mistakes alongside incorrect pagination and meaningless diagrams- and extended this criticism to the whole notion of political education.
Firstly political education was rejected because it represented an extension of state activity which has to be resourced through taxation and therefore could not be seen as a way to construct a better society. He deplored the activities of 'parasites', the political educators, using public money, argued that the school population had 'much better things to do with its time (and our money)' and continued to express the fear that the development of political education would lead to 'calls for a massive injection of funds.'

Secondly, what is sometimes referred to as the 'social authoritarian' element within radical conservatism leads towards a rejection of political education since it is seen as representing an extension of citizen rights. In other words, political education carries the risk of reducing inequality in society and thereby upsetting the 'nature order'. Vincent invoked a conservative interpretation of the democratic process which required 'the need for a great mass of passivity as ballast.' Political education ran counter to this wisdom,

it was argued, with its efforts to convert the classroom into a 'zoo of chatterboxes' and thereby repeal the iron law of oligarchy. Political education was unrealistically attempting 'to coerce those, who by position, habit, and probably inclination are and must be outside the political nation, into adopting the vocabulary and responses of an elite which they cannot in principle join.'

Political education negates choice it was implied, since the audience is 'a captive one'. But above all, political education is dismissed because it is seen as being socialist in purpose. Vincent admits that his prejudices lead him to see political education as dedicated to 'teaching children to believe what their teachers read in The Guardian' (a code word for middle class socialism). His prejudices, he found, were confirmed by inclusion in the PPE report as stimulus material 'two pages of tear-jerking Guardian cuttings on homelessness' and a syllabus which with suspicious intention put 'law and order' in inverted commas. Vincent appeared satisfied with the informal and commonly negative political education accomplished through the hidden curriculum, and alongside his rejection of the political literacy approach of PPE there emerged no alternative and personally acceptable model of political education. Any explicit form of political education it seemed would be unacceptable as classroom practice. Vincent had established the principles that were to shape the future debate; political education was not to be a contested area where the arguments would be about outcomes, contents and methods. Rather, the challenge was to the existence of political education in any direct form.

The fragmentation of political education into a number of specific areas of concern provided easy targets for the New Right to attack in the 1980's. Black studies, women's studies, world studies[48] but above all, peace studies,[49] were 'Scrutonized' by the New Right -a process which ensured maximum politicisation of the political education debate. Frequently the attack on the perceived philosophy or content of a particular area would be extended to embrace the general concept of political education, and constantly fears of indoctrination were voiced. Sir Keith Joseph, founder of the right-wing think tank Centre for Policy Studies and Secretary of State for Education, expressed anxieties about peace studies on numerous occasions. A junior minister Rhodes Boyson, also from the political right, made clear his broad opposition to all the developments, stating that 'a new subject is creeping into political education under its guide, called peace studies, causing immense concern to parents because in some cases it is unadulterated unilateralism and pacifism' and in the Commons 'Politics, like sex education, is something that should be left to the family.'[50] In similar vein Scruton et al. argued that since indoctrination was widespread in schools they considered 'that politically contentious subjects should form no part of the curriculum for those below the age of 16.'[51] The deluge of reports from right-wing think tanks flooded into the pages of the tabloid press where they were treated to an even more sensational gloss. The full authority of the mass tabloid editorials urged the Secretary of State to take decisive action and ban 'these brainwashing sessions' from 'radical teachers' and leave schools to get on 'with real teaching'.

Hysteria in the press over peacestudies and associated subjects was in no way diminished by the action of the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) in appointing an 'Authorised Member for Political Education' in 1981. Councillor George Nicholson was appointed as part of ILEA policy of giving elected members specific education briefs.

Nicholson made public his views that he saw political education as a political force which would be used to change society.[52] Educators and politicians were, he argued, in this sense in the same business and he urged teachers to forget about impartiality when discussing political issues in the classroom. He dissociated himself from the PPE type of political education, dismissed the academic debate that had taken place over the role of political eduation during the last decade, and argued that 'political education is too precious a subject to be left to professors.'[53]

Nicholson's approach to politics in school caused considerable alarm and those who began to speak against were no longer confined to the New Right. In her Dimbleby lecture broadcast on television Baroness Warnock alluded to his appointment and warned about the new risks of indoctrination in schools, stating 'take political education in the ILEA, for example. It has aroused enormous hostility among parents... I think the parents are right: the ILEA is abusing its powers, for political ends.'[54]

The championing body of political education, the Politics Association, also struck a cautious note regarding events as they were unfolding. The Chairman recognised that recent developments in the field created 'dilemmas for the Politics Association. On the one hand we may want to welcome any initiative that encourages the development of politics teaching but on the other hand we do not want controversy to become so intense that a specific politics teaching is driven out of schools and colleges.'[55] But intense controversy there was, with political education becoming an issue which interested not only ideologies on left and right but becoming an important party political issue.

In the run up to the local elections in 1986 the London Conservative manifesto, Pupils Before Politics, promised the return, if elected, of a 'back to basics' curriculum that would end the current indoctrination through banning 'subjects like peace studies'. The manifesto attacked the Labour record which, it was claimed, was responsible for the introduction of 'all kind of rubbish... into the school timetable: racist studies, sexist studies, gay studies, 'peace' studies, party politics.'[56] In addition, a Conservative discussion paper from the party's National Advisory Committee on education argued that some teachers were confusing political education with political indoctrination.[57] The document, however, cited not the fringe subjects attacked by London Conservatives but more mainstream subjects such as humanities, general studies and social studies. These 'catch all' subjects, so the document argued, gave teachers considerable opportunity to undermine the social order.

Here existed the greatest political danger for educators, since it had been argued that PPE's political literacy approach could be taught through established subjects such as these, but with its enquiring approach it resembled closely what looked like indoctrination as outlined in the paper. It was no surprise that Nicholson's politically-motivated model of political education met with widespread resistance, but by the late 1980s the relatively safe and once consensual PPE model of political education was also doubted by a broad section of the party in government. The vigour of the New Right's attack on peace studies and other specialised subjects that could be assembled under the 'alternative political education' banner had raised undiscriminating doubts within a broader section of the party on the wisdom of anything which could be described as political education.

5.4.5. Conclusion

The sharp decline in influence of the political education movement; the loss of stimulus and support from political socialisation researchers; the fragmentation of political education into areas including peace studies and the adverse public attention that this drew, inevitably raise questions about the future of political education in Britain. Of course some political education, including the vilified peace studies, is still found in classrooms but it is a minority activity and remains in a position of risk. There is much to persuade me that my comments reported by Alan Reid still apply; that is, it is still 'a case of keeping heads down and sticking in the trenches. The time is not right yet for advances'.

Nevertheless there have been developments which have encouraged political educators. The lapsed linkage between them and political socialisation researchers is being remedied, with the promise of rendering redundant the extended debate over bias and indoctrination.

Perhaps the most significant developments are occurring inside the Conservative party, where there is growing alarm over what is referred to as 'damage to the social fabric' which has been sustained through the pursuance of Thatcherite economic policies. As might be expected, one-nation tories such as Edward Heath have developed their critique of 'reactionary and regressive' policies which based on acquisitive individualism, have proved highly divisive.[58] Less expected, perhaps, are the coded attacks from Mrs. Thatchers's own senior ministers, frequently expressed as 'personal anxieties' rather than explicit criticisms. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, has expressed concern over the government's lack of concern regarding the 'social and moral context within which the market operates' and a past Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, has argued the need to restore social cohesion through an awakening of civic duty.[59] The current Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, has also lamented the situation in Britain where peace and stability was being undermined not by foreign threats but by the appetite for violence among too many citizens, and he deplored young people with 'too little self-discipline and too little notion of the care and responsibility which they owe to others.'[60]

Whilst opponents of Mrs Thatcher will argue that the logic of these observations is for her government to change the basis of its policies and thus limit damage to the social fabric, there is also an opportunity to press the case for greater provision of political education in schools. The traditional Conservative tendency has always expressed support for political education, albeit the 'maintain civic pride' model which for the 1980's might be more aptly labelled the 'restore civic respect' model. The new challenges for political educators in the 1990's are to (i) tune into the Conservative debate and argue the need for universal political education for "Thatcher's children', which is demonstrable (ii) provide a modified framework for political education which reconciles the goals of interested parties and (iii) provide the materials for non-specialist teachers to use at the classroom level in order to promote successful political education.

5.4.6. Acknowledgements

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5.4.7. Notes

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8. Schools Council (1975). Working Paper No. 53. The Whole Curriculum (London: Evans/Methuen) cited in Heater (1977), op. cit.

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10. For a substantial analysis of the DES documents see T. Brennan (1980). 'Political Education' and 'A Framework for the School Curriculum', Teaching Politics, 9 (3), 257-267

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14. Reid (1985) Ibid.

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16. See Eric Magee, 'Politics at 'A' Level', Mark Smith, 'Non-formal Political Education with Yong People in Youth Work' and Lynton Robins 'Political Education in Vocational Higher Education' in Clive Harver (ed.) (1987) Political Education in Britain. Lewes: Falmer Press

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18. Sir Keith Joseph, M.P. (1976) 'Education, Politics and Society', Teaching Politics, 5(1), 1-9

19. Politics Association Charman's Report, 1981/82

20. DES: The National Curriculum 5-16; a consultation document (July, 1987)

21. Ibid.

22. Letter from Bob Dunn M.P., Under-Secretary of State, dated 29/10/87

23. Letter from L. Webb, DES Schools Branch 3, dated 22/12/87

24. Brennan (1980) op. cit.

25. Ibid. The same points were made in September 1987 by the Schools Curriculum Development Committee in its The National Curriculum 5-16: response from SCDC with reference to subjects such as political education: 'If all such courses have to be subsumed through the foundation courses there would be a danger of loss or attenuation'.

26. Details reported is TES (3rd December, 1982)

27. See, for example, S.J. Marshall (1988) 'The Origins and Development of Political Education'. Teaching Politics, 17(1), 3-10

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50. See The Guardian (23rd June 1982) and Heater (1986) op. cit.

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52. TES (22nd October, 1982)

53. The Guardian (1st October, 1981)

54. The Listener (28th March, 1985)

55. Chairman's Annual Report to the Politics Association, 1982

56. TES (7th March 1986)

57. Reported in TES (22nd February, 1985)

58. Mr. Heath's most vituperative attack on Mrs. Thatcher's government was made in the first Harold Macmillan Memorial Lecture in which he condemned them as unpopular, authoritorian, unfair, divided, uncaring, obstinate, intolerant and paranoid. See The Guardian (14th May, 1988)

59. See David Selbourne's article in 'The Challange to Thatcher' series, The Guardian (18th April, 1988)

60. Mr. Hurd speaking at the Annual Police Confederation Conference, The Guardian (19th May, 1988)

5.5 The Spiral of De-Legitimation of Power in Poland

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5.5.1. The spiral of de-legitimation of political power in poland

Motto:
'Tsy-kung asked, how should one govern. The master replied: 'It is necessary to secure an abundance of food, a large army, and win the people's confidence.' Tsy-kung said, 'If it's impossible to have all three, which one should I give up first?' The master replied: 'Give up the army'. Tsy-kung asked: 'If, by no means, I can hold onto the remaining two, which should I give up first?' The master replied: 'Give up the food. From time immemorial mankind's fate is death, but no government is able to stand without the people's confidence'.
From Confucian Dialogues

In the theory of politics and the sociology of political relations an analysis of the existing interdependencies between the authorities (political aspect) and its legitimacy (value and cultural aspects) is of fundamental importance. This problem has been dealt with and has been thoroughly analyzed by Max Weber[1]. In Weber's sociology, the problems of legitimizing power, or broadly speaking politics in general, relations between the rulers and the ruled, the roles of politics and politicians in creating an ideological moral 'consent' for somebody's rule, are recurrent themes analyzed from various view points. Today Weber's idea of legitimate state authority inspires criticism of its elements as well as general challenges[2].

There are two such challenges which can be formulated in the following question: must political orders always be expressed in a legitimate form (one that is considered 'valid', i.e. subjectively and normatively binding on certain indicated grounds)? The second challenge can be formulated as follows: are not the concepts of the legitimacy of state authority as developed by Weber outdated in the contemporary world? Have new mechanisms of maintaining and validating a political order, other than the ones perceived by Weber, been formed? Both these challenges are serious and justified.
Weber's concept inspired many contemporary discussions on the sources and manifestations of the crisis of legitimacy of state authority in modern Western civilization. Poland, with its cultural and intellectual heritage still belongs, though in a very specific form, to this civilization. This justifies, or at least explains, my interest in the Weberian 'legitimacy problematique'.

Every authority wishes to be recognized as legal, legitimate, and that its privileges (for example an unequal distribution of material goods) be regarded as natural and deserved, consistent with a sense of justice, in the system of moral values dominating in a society. Every authority has always claimed a need for its 'self-justification', which is an essential condition for its continuity and efficiency. It

wants the rulers to believe in their own legitimacy. Belief in legitimacy is a manifestation of the cognitive and normative capacity of a socialized individual. People accepted the state authority at face value and approved it both physically and morally. When posing the question: on what principles may we base the validity of power namely the right by which the subject should be obedient to the officials, and both of the aforementioned should be obedient to the lords, Weber sought the answer in social relation, the sphere of religion, law, economics, politics and culture. Nevertheless, his analysis entirely lacks the element of citizens' participation as the source of legality, or this participation is reduced to elections and passive machine-like membership in mass political parties.
According to Weber, under a legal and rational authority, political passiveness is a condition for an effective functioning of the state and an approval of the leaders' activity is a condition sine qua non of maintaining charismatic rule.
In analyses of radical social movements, which appeared in the sixties and seventies in capitalist, democratic countries, both in Western Europe and North America, as well as the outbreaks of mass protests and the emerging of a political opposition in socialist countries in Eastern Europe, Weber's approach to political legitimacy has been verified. In this respect, sharp controversies have come about, most of which concerned the problem if social movements are a challenge to the existing social order or not. There were also attempts to answer the question if social movements must be followed by a crisis of legitimacy.

Basically, two ways of approaching these phenomena have appeared. J. Habermas and his followers tend to look upon social movements as a sign of legitimization conflicts, which refer to normatively determined social identity and result from 'fundamental contradictions' of the social order threatening social integration.[3] Habermas vindicates the role of society, its political primacy over the government. He acknowledges that today governments have some role in society's integration and the formation of its identity. For Habermas legitimacy today is a claim put forward by governments. It is also a process, a complex political process within economic and cultural roots. Nevertheless, at the same time he remarks: 'The state doesn't, it is true, itself establish the collective identity of a society; nor can itself carry out social integration through values and norms, which are not at its disposition'[4].
This sentence brings to mind not only the situation in West Germany or France, but also in Poland, our main concern. For Habermas in modern Western countries there are four combined crisis-tendencies. They are: 1. economic and 2. political rationality crises, as well as 3. motivational and 4. legitimacy crises. Polish sociologist W. Wesolowski noticed that: 'In Poland there exist extra-governmental institutions and milieus which prevail in shaping the sphere of norms and values and limit the state monopoly in this respect'.[6]
On the other hand, arguments have appeared which seem to indicate that social movements in Western democratic countries neither violated nor questioned the legitimacy of the socio-political order, but they 'rather sought their own just share in profits... and demanded the extension of the majority's rights to themselves'.[7] Representatives of this trend tended to reject the concepts of political legality and legitimization crisis considering them inadequate for an analysis of contemporary phenomena. They insisted that legitimacy in modern states can be at best a function of an effective system and the functioning of the system as such may cause the representation of legality become

to redundant.[8] This type of thinking also disregards the significance of political behaviour and does not take into account the difference between objective causes, bringing about support and loyalty towards the system on the one hand, discontent and protest on the other, and the arguments by which any of these kinds of behaviour is justified by its own participants.
The suitability of the concept of 'legitimacy of authority' and 'crisis of legitimacy' in analyzing the events in Poland, starting in 1980 and processes produced before has also become an instrument of sharp disputes and polemics. Questioning in general the suitability of using expressions to analyze society shows that the heretofore relative suitability of the system was not based on its legitimacy from the view of the masses.[9] Other researchers have undertaken an analysis of its roots and symptoms of the crisis of legitimacy in Poland.[10]
Moreover, the problem is difficult to outline singularly since the concept of political legitimacy is defined diversely. For the clarity of further considerations I will accept the definition of J. Habermas, who says that: 'legality means that the order of political values is acknowledged. Legality is a claim to equity which must be subject to doubt... Therefore historically and analytically the concept is to be used above all in situations in which the legality of the order is questioned, in which -as we have stated- problems of legality may have appeared. One side rejects, and the other maintains legality'.[11] He calls attention to the fact that it is not enough that people believe in a 'maxim' and legitimize a political system by their belief. Inadequate belief can legitimize a bad system, one which does not serve the people. Legitimacy belief -in a global societal sense- must be made rational. The stresses that 'if belief in legitimation is conceived as an empirical phenomenon without an immanent relation to truth, the grounds upon which it is explicitly based have only psychological significance. Whether such grounds can sufficiently stabilize a given belief in legitimacy depends on the institutionalized prejudices and observable behavioral dispositions of the group in question. If, on the other hand, very effective belief in legitimacy is assumed to have an immanent relation to the truth, the grounds on which it is explicitly based contain a rational claim to validity that can be tested and criticized independently of the psychological effect of these grounds'.[12]
Rulers' demands for legitimacy are brought before two courts: one of the people and one of the truth.
The proposals put forward by Habermas definitely revindicate the problem of civil society's primacy over the state and do so in a complex way which is inevitable in relation to modern times.

5.5.2. Problems of legitimacy in Poland

The problems of the legitimacy of the authorities does not appear in Poland for the first time. It also arose during previous crises (principally in the years 1956 and 1970). In 1956 the formulation and acceptance of a program was developed which was perceived by society as being the 'Polish road to socialism'. Wladyslaw Gomulka to a significant degree contributed to the program. He became identified with the contemporary fight for national independence.
In 1971, slogans were put forward to accelerate technological and economic development, aiming at a rapid increase in the standard of living in society. An additional element strengthening acceptance of the program was a change in the style of government, which, in the

initial stage, was launched by Edward Gierik.
In both instances, in the program of the party as well as in the personages of the leadership, support of society as a whole was attained.
In the eighties, we have to deal with a different situation, one which attests to the fact that independent organizations tend to emerge in societies. Political consciousness has become richer due to previous experiences. Two additional elements are essential:
- the depth of the economic crises, as well as the lack of a possibility of quickly surmounting them; and
- the conviction that changes executed as a result of previous crises have not proved effective, since they haven't prevented the appearance of new, further crises.

These crises have often appeared in the form of a lack of confidence regarding both the party's program as well as its realization. This lack of confidence has continued despite deep changes in party and state institutions, and despite the support which Gen. W. Jaruzelski attained after assuming the function of prime minister in 1981 and later - in the autumn of 1981 that of First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR).
The conviction among Poles that the authorities can be made credible only through the attaining by the whole of Polish society of real influence on the governing process has become consolidated in the eighties. We have come to the conclusion that a legitimization of the authorities is possible -taking into consideration that the political consiciousness of society has crystallized in recent years- but only as a result of democratization of society. Nevertheless, with the exception of a rather universal agreement as to the necessity of democratization of the system as well as society's role in undertaking political decisions, a clearly defined road to the realization of these goals is lacking.
Anyhow, the realization of the process of legitimization of the political authorities demands the development of the following questions:
- the necessity of reconciling the leadership role of the marxist-leninist party when the democratization of the representative system (a democratization of voting regulations in the direction of creating the possibility of the participation in political decisions by people who have the support of society, regardless of their party membership). Among others, rather numerous examples of the rigging of votes in the national council election of June 19, 1988, show that this postulate is far from being realized. Obviously it is necessary to work out solutions permitting the participation in political decisions independently of party membership. Such solutions could establish a control element in the activities of the political system, preventing it to become closed as well as permitting its adaptation to changing conditions. For the authorities it would be a step in the right direction of attaining legitimacy for its activities;
- the necessity of creating institutionalized mechanisms permitting various organizations, above all trade unions to exert pressure on political decisions in a manner compatible with obligatory, law-abiding principles;
- the necessity of an assurance of an unhampered flow of information as long as it does not infringe on the narrow, separate sphere of state interests for which the condition is, amongst others, the independence and self-dependence of learning, freedom as speech and of the press, permitting the voicing of various opinions, etc.

These fundamental problems have appeared in the political consciousness of Polish society as essential to the process of legitimization of the political authorities.

5.5.3. The spiral of de-legitimization of the political authorities

There is no way to understand the transformation of consciousness during the 80's without a short recollection of the changes of the previous decade. Briefly, in the first half of the seventies, a universal growth of social expectations and aspirations arose - the 'revolution' of growing aspirations, however in the second in face of the rather slow pace of satisfying these needs the 'revolution' of growing frustrations. Here is a collection of the index of social aspirations in the years 1973-1980:[13]

1973-1974	1978	1979	February 1980	June 1980
60%	45%	39%	44%	22%

(percentage of optimists, expecting an improvement in their standards of living in the near future)

The decade of the eighties in Poland abounds with significant as well as dramatic events and political processes. A deep economic and political crisis, an open political conflict between the authorities and other political forces, the declaration and withdrawel of martial law and the slow process of normalization are only the most essential of these political processes. They remain in close contact with the political culture of society and assume a character of reflexive tension. In effect, a certain state of political culture has taken shape the research of which is essential from both purely educational as well as from practical viewpoints.
The course of political events in the 80's lends itself to an analysis according to the categories of fight and political conflict, the latter not diminishing in spite of a reduction in scope of the degree of tension. Both sides of the conflict still undertake a series of activities having as a goal the shaping of the social consciousness in a direction favourable to the realization of customary goals. In this context it seems important to stress among other things the degree to which activity of both sides is known in various environments, to what degree they are appreciated, and in what sphere representatives of these environments are included in this activity through their conduct. The results of such analyses can serve for future prognoses of society's political behaviour.

The most essential image in the sphere of social consciousness in the eighties is the continuing crisis of legitimacy of the authorities which can be defined more precisely as the 'spiral of delegitimization of the authorities'. The results of sociological studies have shown: 'The appearance for the deficit of legitimacy and motivation based on the fact that the equity and justice of the socio-political system is publicly questioned, that social institutions are not in a state to fulfill the list of demands which the state and socio-political system demand. The level of this deficiency of legality doesn't, however, reach the level of a refusal of obedience in face of the authorities and the universal appearance of radical postulates for rebuilding the system'.[14] In the consciousness of Polish society, the barriers and obstacles, that block the democratization of the political system and its 'opening' are still strong.

Numerous sociological studies conducted on a representative level as well as joint experiments of Polish society in the eighties have confirmed the many arguments affirming a feeling of the 'spiral of delegitimization of the authorities' in the social consciousness.[15]

I'll mention the most important arguments:

a. *The intensity of distrust in institutions and public figures*
The social disposition has worsened systematically, and, after successive price increases, the feeling of pessimism has increased. Throughout the eighties, starting with the period 1980-1981, when there was a noticable sharp fall in confidence in state institutions, especially regarding the PUWP and the government, a low level of confidence in public institutions and personalities of the public sphere was maintained. Especially from the autumn of 1987 till the spring of 1988 this drop in confidence became more pronounced, which is proven by the heightened emotions concerning prices in union with the anouncement and realization of the price increase.
The popularity of leading politicians declined as gauged by the percentage of those who declared sympathy or antipathy for them.

b. *A reduction of social harmony due to the simultaneous growth of a feeling of social tension*
Results of sociological polls, conducted at the end of 1987 and the beginning of 1988 show a decrease in the significance of social harmony in the consciousness of the Poles. If in 1984, amongst matters essential for Poland and the Poles, social harmony was listed in second place, in 1988 12% of those polled perceived this problem as being important. Moreover, an increase of social tension and fear linked with the growth of inflation and a perception of the worsening economic situation sprang up.

c. *The belief in the possibility of conflict*
The possibility of a successive explosion is perceived in society. Research from March 1988 indicates such a state of thinking and foresaw the possibility of the outbreak of a conflict, which came about at the end of April and beginning of May 1988. The belief in the possibility of a conflict arose principally among young people, inhabitants of big cities, people with a higher education, and those who defined their material situation as bad. If we analyze this ex post, these groups were the most active in the conflict between the authorities and society in the spring of 1988. In February 1988, 70% of those Poles polled, perceived a reason for the explosion of a conflict. The material situation of society, which since 1987 was estimated by sociologists as most conducive to a conflict, was considered the main cause. It provided grounds for any future conflict. In previous periods only two spheres were conflict-generating: the political and the economic.

d. *A decline in the economic situation*
The conviction has appeared that as far as the economic situation is concerned there is a continuing regression and that this process will only worsen. Starting in 1984, as sociological studies have indicated, social resistance has grown and the negative reaction against the economic policies of the government has intensified, especially in the matter of prices. The idea that real pay had decreased has become consolidated in several social groups. Successive price increases have strengthened the feeling of a

worsening economic situation and confirm the conviction that price hikes mean a worsening of the situation. The government is considered culpable for all of this. At the same time price hikes are not perceived as mechanisms for regulating the functioning of the market but as a result of the government's inefficient policies. Moreover, it is considered that the government is infringing upon a sphere especially significant for society, namely the economic situation.

e. *The stabilization of public opinion on a critical level*
This thesis was published for the first time publicly in the spring of 1988 in the columns of a widely distributed periodical, because a sociological study conducted in the autumn of 1987 and the beginning of 1988 detected a drastic breakdown of the disposition of society. Indeed, already in 1984 negative opinions dominated positive opinions about the economy, but the peak of social dissatisfaction appeared only in the fall of 1987. As usual this is another example of the application of Karol Kautsky's formulation whereby: 'consciousness is after the fact'[16] but does so tardily. Another indication of the stabilization of social dispositions is the ongoing belief about the lack of a possibility of correcting the situation in the course of the next few years. The belief has increased, whereby Poland's economic difficulties have a constant character, and an opportunity for accelerating the rate of economic growth is not perceived.

f. *The conviction of the necessity of radical reform*
In March 1988, 88% of those polled diagnosed the state of Poland's economy as being catastrophic and at the same time indicated the necessity of radical reform. The belief of the necessity of a radical reform contains in itself a frankness with regard to solving the problem. The reform does not have to be of a socialist character, rather, it is important that the economic situation should be improved. One should stress that the continuing spiral of délegitimization of the government is a consequence of its manner of governing. Often, even the workers of the socialized economy, and therefore, those who will carry out the reform, don't believe that it can succeed. Only one out of five adult Poles recognizes the reform proposed by the government as being consistent with what the economy needs.

g. *Society's lack of identification with traditional socialist ideology*
The identification has never been deep or universal, nevertheless the observed lack of identification is qualitatively new, strengthening the thesis of the spiral of delegitimization of the authorities. It is expressed in a universal and open way, distancing from ideology and politics. The crisis is perceived in society as being, to a certain extent, a crisis of socialism. Its expression is -in a social manner- the fact that in the ideological sphere the party has not been able, until now, to conduct an indispensable re-evaluation and up-dating. Hence opinions, expressed by the government in the name of society, and public opinion vary from society's views and opinions at large. Moreover, there exists an abuse of generalizations which doesn't correspond with practical experience. Apart from other factors that weakened participation in the campaign, e.g. the critical perception by society and the negative evaluation of the propaganda campaign conducted for the elections to the national council on June 19, 1988. It was understood that despite the fact that the mechanism of

the elections had changed, the propaganda campaign was conducted in the same old style, which significantly contributed to society's discontent with participation in the elections. In the social consciousness the authorities find themselves in a continuous emotional, perceptive and behavioral isolation, which has recently been expressed by society's conduct during the referendum in November 1987 and the election to the national council in June 1988.

h. *Tolerance in the face of unrest as an expression of the compression of social disposition*
The spiral of social discontent expresses itself in an acknowledgement of the existence of the causes of the explosion of a social conflict, otherwise defined as "agreement for a conflict". As a result of the long-standing economic stagnation a compression of social dispositions has taken place. The accumulation of negative social and economic phenomena in society's feeling limits the possibilities of both individuals and society. Disparity between material and spiritual limits and the level of social aspirations is becoming deeper. Because institutionalized safeguards of social peace are weak and do not guarantee an outlet for explosive dispositions, - the range of social peace and quiet is diminishing as a consequence. This can be interpreted as a sympton of greater tolerance in the face of activities directed at the way out of the impasse, even at the price of social discontent.

5.5.4. Final remarks

The explicit crisis of legitimacy, which became manifest in August 1980 and is still continuing, has become deeper even during its most recent period. A clarification of the mechanisms of this constant phenomenon is not an easy matter. Weber's conception of the legitimacy of authority and rule, used to analyze this phenomenon, enters the area of existing mechanisms of the functioning of contemporary society. Two aspects directly linked with politics as a sphere of human activity appear:
- the question of legitimacy of politics themselves as activity aimed at the realization of the state's goals; and
- the role of politics and politicians as a source of legitimizing the authorities and their rule.

Max Weber, however, omitted the role of processes in forming public opinion; the state of social consciousness as a reaction to the manner of functioning of politics; and the role of political education and political culture. Therefore Jurgen Habermas' conception penetrated significantly deeper into the mechanism of the process of legitimizing. It creates complete possibilities of clarifying the complicated processes of legitimizing the authorities and especially -which is more difficult- the crisis of legitimacy.

The hypothesis presented as the 'spiral of délegitimization of the authorities' in Poland refers to the concept of J. Habermas and his followers, treating social movements as phenomena of the conflicts of legitimacy. It shows how very deep the crisis of legitimacy in Polish conditions is. Perhaps it can be a turning point in the further functioning of the system or a boundary which, once crossed - with the clear agreement 'about conflict' by Poles gives a situation whereby legalizing arguments, though in a constantly weaker degree, cause that the political use of the force of argument or of force itself ceases to suffice.

I don't foresee the possibility of the realization of these consequences as being the result of the 'spiral of délegitimization of the authorities' although life will verify the above hypothesis.

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5.6 The Concepts of Politics: the Schizophrenia between Political Education and Political Reality in Hungary

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5.6.1. Introduction

In this paper I intend to analyze the contradictions, even the schizophrenia of the political education in the Eastern European socialist countries on the basis of Hungarian experience. I believe that there is much in common in the political education of the state socialist countries, especially the Eastern European ones. Although my analysis is based on Hungarian society, the findings of this paper have, to a certain extent, a general validity shedding a light on political education in Eastern European countries. No attempt is made here to provide a comparison with other Eastern European countries. As a result of this only the actual situation of Hungary's political education is described here.
The paper is made up of three parts. In the first I give a brief sketch of institutionalized political education. In the second I write about the crisis of Hungary's political education emerging in the 80s. Finally the alternatives to official political education are examined, including subcultures, social movements and other types of informal groups. The author's research is part of a research project on the sociology of youth organized by the Budapest Institute of Social Sciences.

5.6.2. The system of political education in Hungary

In Fig. 1 you find the structural outline of Hungary's political education. Letters and numbers in the text refer to this Figure. I will try to explain the Hungarian system of political education and its problems in terms of this model. As you see, there are three sections named: Governmental (A), Political (B), Social (C). These are the three sections of the system of political education in Hungary. Governmental political education is a part of the general system of state education (A 1-3-4-5), and it is directed by the Ministry of Culture and Education (MM). With the exceptions of the churches, which have some secondary schools and faculties for theology, the state has a monopoly on education. There are governmental organizations which are not a part of the system of state education, but they have important functions in political education. Ministries, governmental offices, the army, the police etc. all provide special courses in political education which does not belong, or only partly belongs to the authority of the Ministry of Culture (A 2). Among the governmental institutions of political education, which belong to the Ministry of Culture, we can distinguish between general political education or 'civic education' (A 3-5), and special, mainly postgradual management training courses for special types of leaders (A 1).

Section B is made up of the institutions of legal political

organizations not belonging to the sphere of the state. Similar to other socialist countries, organizations mentioned in this section are the most powerful architects of politics. The Eastern European state socialist political systems are dominated by a single party. Accordingly the first organization mentioned here is the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (B 1), the only legal political party of Hungary since 1948. The party has its own central Academy for Politics in Budapest, and a local network providing political education too, called evening classes in Marxism-Leninism (B 1). The aim of this educational structure is to educate party officials and politicians in post-graduate and other courses. Other legal political organizations like the trade-unions, Peace Council, etc. also have their own courses in political education (B 2).

There is a major difference between governmental and political institutions specialized only in the political education of youth (A 3-5, B 3-5), and the other ones attended mainly by adults (A 1-2, B 1-2), aged over 30. The political institutions of the political education of youth are structured according to the levels of the state education system: the pioneer's organization for school children aged 6-14, and the Communist Youth Association for young people in secondary schools and tertiary-level education (aged 14-18 and 18-30). The Pioneer's Organization is the only legal political organization for children in Hungary. Above the age of 14 (on the secondary school and university level) the Communist Youth Association has been the sole legal political organization of youth in Hungary since 1957. Both organizations have a major role in political education and socialization in Hungary. The Pioneer's Organizations are directed by school teachers who are also members of the Communist Party and by young people who have already become members of the Communist Youth Association. The Association is led by the Party, it is the youth organization of the Party.

The structure and character of the system of political education are to a great extend shaped by the political institutions of Hungary. The political system is dominated by the Party, and owing to its overall political power, the governmental and other political institutions are linked and affiliated with each other (Bihari, 1987). This situation results in special problems. Compared with the Western countries, within the school system or outside, the education of selfconscious citizens (civic eduation) is rather weak. Although there is a school subject called 'citizens' knowledge' (A 5), it is obvious that it has to be changed owing to the school subject's simplicity.
At the secondary schools (A 4) there is no special school subject on politics. We can find some information on politics or on political theory in the textbook of history and philosophy or social theory. At the universities and academies education is provided in 'scientific socialism' (A 3) of the political theory of the Marxism-Leninism, and in these courses the issues of Hungary's recent history are also dealt with. Nowadays these courses are sharply criticized and the need to provide courses in political science has also been voiced. The political education of young people is the task of the political organization of youth: as a result, there is no effective civic education in Hungary. I shall speak later about the efficiency of political education within this political organization. Here it is important to stress that the general problem of the political system in Hungary, the lack of differentiation between the government and the Party, reflects the structural problems of political education, the underdevelopment of civic education and the undifferentiated character of the political education of youth in the political organizations.

The other problem is the monolithic character of the dominating political institutions. Only tenets of communist and Marxist-Leninist political science are taught in the institutions of political education, and governmental political education is also dominated by this. Stemming from the logic of the system there is no room left for pluralism in the system of political education. In spite of this political sociology has shown that there is a diversity of ideas in Hungary, especially among youth and intellectuals (Gombár, 1983; Bozóki, 1987; Körösényi, 1987).
This fact causes a schizophrenia of the political education between myths and reality.

5.6.3. The dysfunctions and the crises of the institutionalized political education

An attempt is made to sum up the problems of the institutionalized political education in Hungary which led to its crises in the 80s. I shall deal with the system of political education as a whole, but I will concentrate on the problem of the political education of young people in Hungary, which is connected with the problems of political socialization.

Monolithic character
There is little or almost no pluralism in the institutionalized system of political education. There is no free choice of subjects when someone studies politics in Hungary. Youngsters belong to a political organization with a monopoly on the representation of youth, and adults are also "chanelled" according their professional basis within a system, which should spread a monolithic value system and political philosophy.

From compulsory participation to the 'selective incentives'
The compulsory character dominated political education until 1956. Very much reminescent of Orwell's anti-utopia, '1984', in the fifties during the Stalinist era it was the duty for everybody to participate in political education. Since the failure of the so-called 'personal cult' it is more and more possible to avoid any kind of political education, or to participate in it only formally, without any fear of sanctions.
It is obvious, for example, that students simple do not want to be members of the CYA (B 3-4), which was quite necessary for them before. Hungary's youth demonstrates political passivity. People try to avoid politics and political education, because of their bad memories from the fifties: as a result, they are not much interested in political education (Békés, 1988; Kéri, 1988).
In response to this situation the institutions resorted to a new strategy: they try to encourage participation not through negative but through positive sanctions, through privileges, advantages, 'selective incentives' (Olson 1963).
Additonal free time, special possibilities are the gains of the 'active citizen', participating in political education. It is quite useful for persons intending to attain a politically or economically privilegized position, to participate in institutionalized political education. For managers or would-be managers it is a must to attend political training if they want to retain their managing posts. In terms of career and promotion it is advantageous to participate in political education even if it is not compulsory (with the exeption of the courses for soldiers and certain leaders and officials).

Formal-bureaucratic character
There is not much room for spontaneity and informality in this system. The governmental and the political organizations are highly centralized in Hungary as is political education. Curricula are determined in a unified way by central organizations. Spontaneity, as an organizing principle is especially missing in the political education of youth at schools and in the political organizations. Young people feel the format and content of institutionalized political education to be too abstract, to be hierarchical, centralized and bureaucratic (Note 1).

Ritual character
In the eighties the system of formal political education becomes superficial and a formal ritual in Hungary without real content and meaning. It is noteworthy that only 10% of the students of Budapest are member of the Communist Youth Association, the only legal political organization of youth. This means that the other 90% participates only in 'scientific socialism', or they try to collect their knowledge on politics in society itself. At the central academies an attempt is made to introduce political science instead of scientific socialism: however, teaching will be provided by staff members who used to teach scientific socialism. As a result there will be no genuine improvement in the standards of education.
Generally in society the prestige and the importance of political education are very low. It is looked upon as a 'necessary evil'; the obligatory exams are taken by the students as soon as possible.

Inefficiency
Political rituals are sometimes efficient but this does not apply to political education in Hungary. Surveys on students and intellectuals have shown -the results were widely discussed in public, in the monthly review 'Critics', Kritika-, that in spite of the cumpulsory attendance of the courses on Marxism-Leninism at the universities, these courses are totally ignored and even rejected by many students. Ignorence is widespread among youth on the structure and functioning of the social and political system in Hungary and in other countries although 'citizen's knowledge' is a compulsory subject at schools. The same applies to political education in political organizations (Szabó, Ildikó, 1981; Zsiros, 1979).
Confirmity with the message of political education often results from the individual's reckless career ambitions. In terms of political identification and support for the system, support for political knowledge and information, political education in Hungary is inefficient. These are well known trends in other East European countries too.
Briefly we may say that political socialization and education is in deep crisis in Hungary. The existing institutional structures were established in the late fifties, and there has been no structural change since then (Békés, 1988).
However, the social, cultural and political environment of the institutions of political education has changed, and this made the system more and more formal, ritual, and inefficient. This contradictory situation resulted in the crisis of institutions of political education. The political socialization of youngsters proceeds less and less by institutionalized political education and more and more in the informal organizations and even counter-institutions of political education, i.e. in section C (Gazsó, 1987: 76-84).
This crisis of political education in Hungary may be termed a

schizophrenia, a rift between the official political images and the existing political reality. In this country we find an oversized institutionalized system of political education, which intends to educate, mobilize and indoctrinate every citizen. On the one hand, there is a society whose majority tries to escape from this formal political education, and participates in a formal and ritual way in political education, on the other hand we find those for whom political education is only a means for attaining the good positions of society. The crisis of the political education is only a part of the general crisis of the Eastern European socialist countries which stems from the conflict between 'the state' and society as a whole. This conflict can be felt in all social and political institutions (Hankiss, 1984).
However, there are also some additional causes of the crisis of the system of political education in Hungary. In the following, I shall shortly describe two of them.

Conservativism and the oversized character of formal political education
All people should be influenced by the political education some way. This is the Stalinist concept which has been preserved up till now in the structure, the content, and the method of formal political education. According to Zoltán Békés (1988) 'The political educational system established in the 1950s has essentially preserved some fundamental traits up till the early 80s. It can be mainly characterized by the superabundance of ideological elements, it's most important declared goal is the transmission and propagation of an idealistic socialism derived from an abstract image of the future. Its main aspiration is to have the established political system accepted according to the provided frames of participation. The educational aspirations were motivated by the illusion that parallel to the development of the system - the political sphere gradually interprenetrates the whole society: it takes only time and necessitates only little effort in education and then every member of society becomes active and involved in politics.'
In some areas political education has become a ritual, an empty form and the existence of political education is looked upon as a 'necessary evil'. The oversized character of political education hampers its effectivity and prestige. In other words we might say that political education in a formal sense is present almost everywhere but in reality it hardly exists.

Unclear functions, and the lack of the division of tasks
What should be the difference between civic education and special political education in a political system led by one party?
How to define the task of educating good citizens and how to educate good young communists, if there is only one political organization for all youngsters? The two problems stem from the lack of the division of tasks between the governmental (A) and the political (B) organs, and organizations. The monolithic nature of society which is of course the general illness of the political system of Hungary (Bihari, 1987), also contributes to the crisis of political education. Without the functional differentiation of the various fields of politics, it is not possible to set up a rational and effective division of tasks between government and politics. This applies also to the political education.

5.6.4. Political education in the sphere of society: counter-institutions and reform-experiments

The crisis of formal political education led to the emergence of a type of 'alternative political education' in society. This is indicated in section C of Figure 1. The common feature of these movements and experiments is that they try to develop alternatives to the institutionalized political education through spontaneous experiments of social forces. The search for alternatives is sometimes consciously planned or organized. Sometimes it is only a spontaneous response to the crisis of formal political education.
I believe that political education cannot be interpreted only in terms of institutionalized education. If we extend the meaning of political education to political socialization and political learning we must realize that political education has to do also with non-institutionalized social phenomena (social movements, informal groups and their networks). Sometimes these phenomena do not fit into the official system of political education and influence of it challenges the official system. Borrowing from the categories of Robert K. Merton (1968) the functions of political education are sometimes fulfilled by the non-institutionalized social structures, like movements, subcultures, and counter-cultures.
These social movements represent 'functional alternatives' to the institutionalized political education in special cases.

Let us consider these social counter- or correcting institutions of political education in Hungary. I have to stress that these phenomena are very rarely the subject of scientific research. This is the reason why I cannot always refer to relevant literature. At the Institute of Social Sciences in Budapest in 1986 a research project started on unofficial youth movements in Hungary. My analysis is based on the results of this research.
This lack of officially published literature is due to the fact that in Hungary these movements, groupings and subcultures are partly illegal. The political system of the Eastern European socialist countries is characterized by the fact that the political institutions, especially the party and other political organs, vindicate the right for the only representation of the interest of society. Owing to this they treat all informal and new social-political groups with suspicion or aggression. Especially one part of the political institutions the so-called 'social organizations' (the official and party-led 'peace movement'; the trade unions, the 'workers movement'; and 'women's movement') consider themselves as adequate and only representatives of various social strata and interests. These organizations are referred to in literature (Kolinsky-Patterson, 1976) as 'pseudo-movements' (C 2). Real social movements and experiments in self-organization within society are challenges to an inflexible and intolerant system monopolizing power and representation.

On top of section C we can find the so-called 'dissidents' (C 1). This is a highly qualified intellectual subculture which emerged in the seventies (Knabe, 1988: 126-140). The dissidents established counter-institutions with alternative programmes in political education for a small minority of young intellectuals 'thinking differently'. The free universities, the samisdat press and the public debates (C 1, a-c) are the main shape of this political education and socialization. The topics include seminars on the 'real' history of communist parties, on recent Hungarian history, on political and

social problems, the reforms of an alternative to social and political institutions. We can say that these subjects are not adequately present in the offical media.

In the seventies only the dissidents had an alternative political education in Hungary. But at the beginning of the eighties a new type of alternative politics appears. These are referred to as new social movements, or alternative movements (Szabó Máté, 1988). These movements are single-issue oriented and transitory, mainly concerned with issues of peace and ecology (C 2, a-b). There are differences between the new social movements and the dissidents. The new social movements do not address themselves to the 'classical' political and ideological issues and they are much more open to and ready to cooperate with the official institutions. These movements often search for legal means to ensure their participation in policy making. Peace and ecology movements in Hungary established also seminars and lectures on their issues.
Like the ecology activists the peace movement established a network for discussions. Both movements organized international summer camps for the exchange of experiences and for discussions. Both movements have their unofficial periodicals. The ecology movement established its own foundation and the peace activists have contact with the institutions of peace research in Hungary and abroad. We may say therefore that also the alternative movements of Hungary have created an alternative network of education.
The clubs and the associations (C 2,c) have their own network and profile where peace and ecology issues are only a part of the whole programme (Diczházi 1987). The main issue of this 'club movement' and some of the associations is a kind of alternative political education. The subjects are varied but the discussed issues are the ones that are excluded from the official political education, namely the problems of national identity, the situation of the Hungarian minorities abroad, and the issues of a radical economic, political and social reform in Hungary. The new social movements, the clubs and the associations mobilize much more people than the dissidents. In contrast to dissidents the participation in these movements and clubs is not very much controlled and sanctioned by the state. There are partial and transitory coalitions between the movements and the institutions with ecology and peace issues. So, in terms of political socialization the alternative movements of Hungary seem to have a greater influence than the dissidents. The dissidents have of course a lasting influence on the intelligentsia through its publications. However, direct action and participation is characteristic only of the alternative movements, clubs and associations. Participants in the alternative movements are recruited from all geographical areas and all strata of society. In contrast, the dissidents are only a small intellectual elite group at Budapest.
There are some conflicts between dissidents and the alternative movements. Dissidents believe the alternative movements are too loyal to the state, whereas the ecologists think dissidents are too much obsessed with ideology. However, co-operation between the two groups does occur: lecturers come sometimes from the dissidents to the clubs, and ecology and peace issues are picked up in the samisdat press. There are also common public debates and networks. Owing to the emergence of the new types of alternative policy and political education the monopoly of the dissidents for an alternative political education and counter-institutions, which characterized the seventies in Hungary, was lost in the eighties.
A lot of students were participating in meeting dissidents. The social

basis of the movements, clubs and associations consists also mainly of young intellectuals and students. But there are specific shapes and initiatives for alternative political education which exist within the educational system.
The opposition, the clubs and the associations as an alternative emerged because of the general disfunctioning of official politics. The peace and the ecology movements have specific causes. The student movement (C 3) arose because of the general crisis and problems of the system of education, and especially of the political education in governmental and political institutions. The student movement like the unofficial social movements, is a new form of alternative politics which developed in the eighties.
The student movement consists of three elements: self-government in student hostels, university clubs and recently, since Spring 1988, there has been an alternative youth organization, the Alliance of the Young Democrats (C 3, a-c).
The self-governing student hostels have a network, their own periodicals and alternative courses in political science. Attempts are being made to organize alternative political education in these colleges (Stumpf, 1988). In contrast to the scientific socialism, education is provided in political science. The programme for the student dormitories is more general. General, political and social issues are discussed similar to the movements, clubs and associations.

The unofficial social movements, especially the student movement, are a challenge to the Communist Youth Association, which has an official monopoly on political representation and education. The emergence of the social initiatives, and the activity in the field of politics and political eduction show that the Association is not suited for its tasks. The challenge by the unofficial groups made some political groups within the Association think of reform of this organization and a strategy of collaboration with the informal groups.
The Council of the Universities and High Schools (B 3) declared, that the Association does not want to maintain its monopoly role but wants to act within a pluralistic youth movement, working together with the initiatives taken by young people. In 1987 the Council started an alternative leadership training programme for their officials at the academies, which deals with the ideas of the social movements. The Council advocates a pluralistic youth movement and works together with the alternative movements. The Council affected the political climate at universities, and academies, and this is very favourable to the unofficial movements and groups.

In spite of the fact that there are also reformers within the Communist Youth Association ready to co-operate with the social initiatives, the radicals from the student movement were breaking with the strategy of co-operation with the Association, and they established an alternative political organization. In Spring 1988 parts of the student movement, especially the self-governing colleges of Economics and Law of Budapest University established an alternative political organization for youth, called Alliance of the Young Democrats (FIDESZ, C 3,c). It is difficult to estimate the perspectives of this new initiative, which is a big challenge to the existing structure of political institutions. On the one hand, the police tried to hinder the organization, but on the other hand, Young Democrats managed to be officially accepted by the so called Youth Parliament of the Hungarian Universities.

There are similar initiatives for an alternative policy and political education on the level of the secondary schools. Pupils also participated in peace and ecology groups and clubs (C 4,c) and there are signs indicating the loosening of the institutionalized system of political education. The Council for Secondary Schools of the Communist Youth Association (B 4) tried to develop reforms of the system of political education of the secondary schools, called the 'reform test' (C 4,a) from 1983-1986, and a 'self-government experiment' from 1987 (C 4,b). Both experiments are confined to secondary schools, which voluntarily participate in the social-political experiments supported by the Alliance for working out new models of political education and self-government at schools.
As the first step, from 1983-1986 (Pál, 1987), the existing structure of the Association was blown up, and the pupils got the possibility to organize themselves according to their own ideas. The results were quite ambivalent. There were a lot of problems because the experiment was organized from above by the Central Committee of the Association and by the teachers of schools. It is very hard to introduce pluralism and democracy centrally and in a planned way to adolescents. Debate was the 'political' feature characteristic of the emerging new groups because these were mainly private, or hobby-oriented communities and clubs, which do not concern themselves with politics and political education.
The analyses of the first part of the experience has shown that there was a 'missing link' in it: the dissolving of the conventional type of political organization was not connected with new proposals and possibilities. It cannot be expected that after an inefficient political education and socialization new alternatives should emerge in a spontaneous way. Instead of this the political indifference was apparent. In the second stage of the experiment starting 1987 extended possibilities for the participation in the self-government of schools was offered to the pupils.

For children aged 6-14 the Pioneer's Organization (B 5) is responsible in the system of political education. There are no real social initiatives against this formal-bureaucratic organization. At this age only those experiences of early political socialization of children can be mentioned that run counter to the aims of the offical political education. The influence of the family, of counter-cultures, subcultures and the churches (C 5, a-c) are very much different from that of the pioneer organizations (Note 2), and they have lasting anti-institutional effects.
In almost every Hungarian family children are confronted with a lack of interest in politics, with lack of faith in the legitimacy of the system and a selfish consumerism. A minority of the children participates in subcultures, like drug-addicts, 'street corner society', punks, fan-clubs, etc., where they rebel and protest against the absolutism of the institutionalized order.

The role of the churches in the process of political socialization can also be counter-effective in terms of official political education. In spite of the fact that nowadays all legal churches in Hungary accept and support the social and political order of socialism, going to church may children make aware of the fact that religious activities and participation in the pioneer's organization are incompatible. Only a very small minority participates in radical religious communities and sects in which the way of living is based on religious rules and values. This has sometimes social and political implications like the conscious refusal of military service, etc. Of course, children living

in these communities or families are very differently socialized from what is demanded by official patterns. The effects of this social experience do not fit into the model of the development of the so called 'socialist personality', which was expected to emerge by the founders of the pioneer's organization. The 'socialist personality's' features include a selfless attitude, support to the social and political order, the acceptance of the existing institutions etc. The values and the goals of the pioneer's organization were defined in the Stalinist era (Bogáti, 1987; Trencsényi, 1985), so these are in contradiction with the social and political reality of Hungary today. This situation results in a 'double socialization' of children both in political institutions and society as a whole (Csepeli 1988,; Kéri 1988). This causes a schizophrenia between political education and political reality in Hungary. Unfortunately there are no experiments for alternative political education which could be a remedy to this schizophrenic situation.

5.6.5. Recapitulation and conclusion

Finally let us sum up the general characteristics of the unoffical or 'social' political education experiments in Hungary in comparison with the features of institutionalized-official system of political education (Fig. 2).

Pluralistic
In contrast to the official system, no organization regards itself as the only representative of a specific interest and nobody is excluded from these organizations.
Everybody can make a choice, according to his or her interest or need, for participation in any form of alternative political education. Of course pluralism also means competititon. Some groups and movements, for example, compete with each other for support or funding but no one has the right to exclude the other from the game. This means that the formal monopolies and monolithic nature of the official organs have their counterpart in the unofficial pluralism of political education.

Voluntary character
Whereas formal political education was first compulsory and later on 'selective incentives' (rewards to those loyal to the system) were used now, in the unofficial circles the participation in movements depends on the free will of the individual. The activity in the social sphere of political education is based on the free will of the groups and individuals. Of course the possibilities of and access to the social action are limited by place, time and resources. For example, the students of Budapest enjoy the greatest access to unofficial political education.

Informal-democratic
The organizing principle of unofficial political edcuation is different from the official one. While the latter has a formal-bureaucratic character, the former is informal, not regulated and in a direct way democratic. Unofficial political education is embedded into the non-institutionalized experiences of self-government in Hungary.

From illegal to tolerated
In the Stalinist era, when formal political education was compulsory, alternative political education was illegal and prohibited. The first

attempts of alternative political education emerged in the seventies with the growing tolerance of the system. But at that time a quite ambivalent situation existed: depending on actual political guidelines there were sometimes sanctions against unofficial political socialization. There were also periods when it was tolerated. In the eighties with more experiences with alternative political education together with the reform-orientation of tolerance toward the experiments of alternative political education is growing. There are even coalitions between spontaneous social movements and institutions. Official institutions start reform experiments in political education.

Overload
Sometimes participants in unoffical political education are demanding that the unfulfilled tasks of formal political education be solved carried out.
This would mean an overload for the social initiatives because their legal situation, their organization structure, their resources and their potential is not enough to fulfill the task of political education. Signs indicate that the official system of political education is in crisis. However, the unofficial groups can not function instead of the official structures. They can only encourage change in official political socialization.

The state of affairs of political education in Hungary can be characterized as an institutional system in crisis with some social initiatives proposing alternative solutions to solve this crisis. If we summarize the results of the comparison between the official and the unofficial political education it becomes clear that the institutionalized system has to fight for the 'lost youth' (Àgh 1988) that is not really influenced by the official system. An active minority is already engaged in an alternative political education. To me this challenge seems to exist in all the Eastern European socialist countries. But the existence and the nature of the social initiatives for an alternative political education is very different in the various countries.

In the special case of Hungary, there are many forms of social initiatives which could support the 'reconstruction' or 'rebuilding' of political education. Some of the institutions are flexible enough to pick up ideas from society, for experiments with reforms, or even to build up coalitions with the social initiatives.
To establish coalitions between the social movements and official institutions it could be a general strategy for the renewal of political education. The official institutions should start a learning process, and learn from society. In this way the existing schizophrenia between political education and political reality might be solved.

5.6.6. Notes

1. Some critical opinions on the present situation of the political education of young people. For example a short citation from an critical article on the pioneer's organization. '...It is a compulsory, formal and conceited pseudo-movement... Why do turn the children into hypocrites waving flags like the grown-ups, instead of relying upon voluntary participation? We like to cite Makarenko and Gorky, but the model for this organization emerged later. It mirrors the Stalinist way of organization, state and society -with

all its formalism. It is time to rebuild the pioneer movement and to transform it into a real movement, according to the principles of voluntariness and self-government' (Bogáti, 1987).
Stumpf (1986) analyzing political education within the Communist Youth Association points out the following: The subjects of political education are determined from above, and the methods are also determined in the same way. Instead of the really interesting political topics, which affect youth, there is a dominance of the foreign policy issues. It is a homogenous system, without any concern for the real interests and needs of the participants. Politics is separated from its essence, from the interests and the use of power. Even the language of political education is bureaucratic and abstract, dominated by the ideological phraseology inherited from the fifties and the sixties'.

2. On the role of the family in political socialization of youth in Hungary: Dögei (1986); on subcultures: Kőbányai, 1986; a, b); on small religous communities: Kamarás (1987).

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(Titles in Hungarian are translated in English.)

FIGURE 1

THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL EDUCATION IN HUNGARY

A. Governmental
   1. Gradual and post-gradual trainings
      National Management Centre (OVK) for the economy Management
      Institute of the Ministry of Culture for cultural administration
      High School for Administration (AIF) for the public administration
   2. Special management trainings
      Organized by ministries, offices, army etc.
   3. Universities and colleges
      Students aged 18-30, tuitition is provided in 'scientific socialism' or 'political science'
   4. Secondary schools
      Learners aged 14-18, receive education in recent history or 'social philosophy'
   5. Primary schools
      Children aged 6-14, receive education in 'citizens' knowledge'

B. Political
   1. Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP)
      The Academy of Politics (MSZMP PF)
      Evening classes in Marxism-Leninism (national network)
   2. Social organizations or 'pseudo-movements'
      Trade-unions (SZOT), Peace Council (OBT), Patriotic People's Front (HNF)
   3. The Communist Youth Association (KISZ)
      Council for High Schools (EFT)
   4. The Communist Youth Association (KISZ)
      Council for Secondary Schools (KSZT)
   5. Pioneer's Organization (MUSZ)
      Children aged 6-14

C. Social
   1. Dissidents
      a. free universities
      b. samisdat press
      c. public debates
   2. Unofficial social movements
      a. peace
      b. ecology
      c. clubs, associations
   3. Student movement
      a. self-government in the student hostels
      b. social-political clubs
      c. alliance of the Young Democrats (FIDESZ)
   4. Secondary schools
      a. reform tests
      b. experiments in school self-government
      c. informal groups and subcultures
   5. Political socialization at an early age
      a. family
      b. subcultures
      c. churches

FIGURE 2

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL POLITICAL EDUCATION

Institutional-official (A, B)	Social (C)
a. Monolithic	a. Pluralistic
b. From compulsory participation to 'selective incentives'	b. Voluntary participation
c. Formal-bureaucratic	c. Informal-democratic
d. Ritual	d. From illegal to tolerated
e. Inefficiency	e. Overload

Part III Selected Abstracts

6. Twelve Selected Abstracts

6.1. Trends of the Current West German Educational Policy (Ackermann, H., University of the Federal Armed Forces, Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany)

After a period of declining interest, educational policies of the federal and the state governments regained interest again and caused a discussion about educational goals. In early 1988 the federal parliament set up a commission ("Bildung 2000") with the task to analyze and to check steps and shifts for education in state schools, vocational and in-service training. This examination of the current educational system follows the assumption that the welfare of industrialized nations depends on a high quality of education. The demand to introduce 'new technologies' into high school curricula is significant for this political assessment. While the educational systems become more and more a general social problem, the public funds for education are still very limited comparedg with other public policies. Different from the 1960s and 1970s current reform approaches are not mean to expand the system of secondary and higher education or to raise the level of general education. Correspondingly better education for all is no longer legitimized as a 'citizen's right' to equal opportunities and social justice and equality. The 'social demand approach' is substituted by a new 'manpower requirement approach' strictly related to economic needs and objectives. The paper describes these shifts within the current educational policies and analyzes the societal influences as well as the currently discussed concepts of educational policy.

6.2. Ethics and International Affairs: Human Rights in the East-West Context (Baehr, P.R., Leiden University, The Netherlands)

The question of what is 'good' and what is 'bad' behavior by states in international affairs is hardly new. From early times on, governments have tried to present their foreign policy activities in moral or pseudo-moral terms. The debates have received a new impetus by the emphasis on human rights issues in present-day international relations. Interpretations of the universal nature of these rights and their implementation vary widely, in particular between East and West. Non-governmental organizations tend to base their activities on the presumed universality of the norms, as exemplified in international declarations and binding treaties.

The paper focuses on the role of considerations of an ethical or moral nature in modern international relations. Are international relations mainly or only a matter of 'interests defined in terms of power'? Or are there norms for foreign policy behavior of a 'higher' nature, possibly coinciding with long term or enlightened interests?

6.3. Polish Youth: Dichotomic World of Values (Bodnar, A, & Zelichowski, R., Centralny Osrodek Metodyczny Studiow, Poland)

The sources of the changes within the system of values of Polish youth one should seek on three levels:

1. For many years there has been a continuous process of diminishing traditional class differences (in a Marxist sense).Emerging new structures one may call internally differentiated middle-class. This process causes diffusion of the cultural values by the strata of the large social groups, at the same time creating the crises of ideologial, educational patterns traditionally existing in the scope of the respective classes.
2. Since the beginning of the 20th century Poland has been ridden regularly by the wars or social crises. The results of social studies on Polish youth indicate that young people have developed a strong historical consciousness which makes them extremely critical when it comes to the fostered ideology and socio-political institutions.
3. Polish culture and political culture of the Polish nation is traditionally rooted in European culture. It explains the easy convergence of ideas and intellectual unrest on the international scale. They are reflected in the attitudes and systems of values. Poland has become a pluralist society. This factor shapes the social consciousness of Polish youth. At present Poland is in a process of deep structural changes. It offers an unprecedented challenge to both for ideologists and politicians.

6.4. Education as Challenge and Emancipation: Perspectives for a Global Political Science (Burt, G., Institute of Educational Technology, England)

Political science today has a tendency to be ethnocentric rather than global, to focus on the state and to ignore the substance of politics. Looking at world society today we find a complex array of global political forces. Abstracting from this array, the force for globalisation and modernisation is dominant, challenged by 'anti-systemic' forces from within modernity as well as by (sometimes local) forces of 'tradition'. Although these forces may struggle over the state, they are themselves embedded in the wider (global) society. The (global) cultural an ideological reproduction of these force is sustained in part by political education. (Political science is itself part of this process-predominantly contributing to the force of modernity.)

The resolution of global problems requires a challenge to the political dominance of modernity. To this end 'Education as Challenge and Emancipation' is proposed as a component in the reproduction of anti-systemic forces. Different global locations are likely to require different types of challenge. Although understandably much attention is given to locations where anti-systemic forces are strongest, what is perhaps most needed is cultural and ideological development offering challenge and emancipating in the heartlands of modernity.

6.5. Guest Workers and Refugees: A Challenge for Citizenship Education (Claussen, B., University of Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany)

The paper comprises, in the main, four sections: To begin with, diverse phenomena pertaining to the complex issue of guest workers and

refugees, as manifested at national and/or regional levels, are discussed in the context of their general political and civic/civil rights' character as well as their interlacement in international constellations. This is followed by a precise analysis of the embedded challenge for citizenship education - a critical analysis based on a normative concept for the democratization of (world) society. Moreover, possibilities and limitations of mastering the veritable bundle of tasks facing citizenship education are elaborated; they are focused in reflections on an intra-national intercultural education and equally in considerations towards an internationalization of citizenship education. Finally this line of thought leads to the development of research perspectives for political science under the aspect of cooperation in the interest of responding to questions of global significance. Nevertheless, the contribution is designed as a 'theory sketch' which strives to link reflections that have only been revealed in facets to date.

6.6. Impediments to the Internationalization of Political Education: A Ten-Year Perspective (Conley, M.Wm., Acadia University, Nova Scotia, Canada)

Following on the theme of the panel the author examines the theoretical perspectives of political education as espoused in Canada, the United States, and Britain and contrast these with actual practice in these three countries.

It is the author's contention that there is a substantial gulf between the theory of political education and its practice. The 'impediments' to political education (and ultimately to its internationalization) are the result of a number of factors which may be inter-related. Amongst others, these factors consists of poor training facilities and methodologies, improper and inadequate resource materials, under-qualified teachers, and unsympathetic or hostile school authorities and government officials. An analysis of these factors will be followed by prescriptions for improvement in order to progress along the path towards a globalization and internationalization of political education.

6.7. Religious Factors, Political Culture, and Political Geography in the United States (Elazar, D.J., Bar Ilan University and Temple University, U.S.A.)

Thirty years of research into American political culture has demonstrated the vital importance of religion in shaping American political culture and its subcultures. The main patterns of connection between Protestant denominations and Catholic ethnic subgroups and the moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic subcultures of the United States have been documented and their links with the political geography of the United States generally mapped. Since the initial work done on this theme, there have been several developments of major importance including:

1. the Protestant fundamentalists' active entry into political life;
2. accelerated migration from the Northeast to the South and West;
3. declining membership in and influence of mainstream Protestant denominations;
4. the ethnic revival, especially among Catholics. This paper examines the impact of these changes on the political geography of the United States and American regional political subcultures.

Preliminary results of our research suggest that:

1. The fundamentalists' involvement in politics has strenghtened the synthesis between the traditionalistic and individualistic political cultures for that group and simultaneously offered opportunities for participants in that syntheses to express themselves outside the South, its native region.
2. The migrations have generally followed previous lines of cultural migration with some important exceptions, while the shift of political power to the South and West has strenghtened the political subcultures which those regions have traditionally represented.
3. Institutional changes in Protestantism have not carried over into cultural changes among the various groups in the Protestant tradition.
4. The ethnic revival, although less long-lasting than originally anticipated, has strenghtened the importance of political culture as a unifying force linking different ethnic groups within common and acceptable American patterns.

6.8. Uses of Systems Theory, Decision Making, and Public Policy Analyses for International Political Education and Socialization Research (Farnen, R.F., University of Connecticut, U.S.A.)

This concept paper illustrates some basic conceptual frameworks and models, which are useful both for contemporary political analysis and for guidelines to the conduct of cross national political sozialization research and the formulation of political education instructional materials with an international perspective. These models are based on systems theory and public policy analysis, both of which have impacted on tertiary level political education, but far less frequently on primary or secondary political education and even more seldom on political socialization research at any level of analysis.

Discussion of the systems/policy analysis work of Eastern, Dye, Coplin, Nagel, Lindblom, and Woll leads to a description of more specialized models such as Himmelweit's (1980) on television influences and both the U.S.A. National Citizenship Assessment (1965) and the I.E.A. 's Civic Education in Ten Countries (1975) models. Certain basic and nearly universal concepts (such as power, authority, legitimacy, freedom, equality, decision making, nationalism, and constitutionalism) are also widely shared, and though implemented differently at the public policy level, contribute to the development of some common frames of political analysis. The internationally applicable work of Blum, Piaget, and Kohlberg regarding development and maturation, cognitive styles, and moral stages is also relevant to the possible development of a higher order synthetic model which may be a useful guide for cooperative research and curriculum development efforts under the auspices of UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and other international organizations

6.9. Modernity and Tradition: Dilemmas of Political Education in Developing Countries (Kili, S., Bogaziçi University, Turkey)

The differences between modern and traditional political systems have continued to be an important topic of study for political scientists. However, recent studies have tended to de-emphasize the earlier

contention that traditional values and modernity are incompatible. Political developments, including changes in political systems, have made it clear that modernity and tradition are not always entirely distinct. In developing countries the educational system is a major agency in achieving the consensus so urgently needed. Political education, in particular, is an important tool of integration and mobilization. Particularly in recent years, some developing countries have totally rejected western values and ideas of modernity as being applicable to their own societies. Instead, traditional mores and values have been asserted as dynamic and integrative elements of polical education. The differences in the historical, political, and social structures of the developing countries make it difficult, to find a common explanatory reason for the dilemmas of modernity and tradition in political education. However, this paper attempts to give some answers as to why especially in some developing countries a return to tradition has replaced the quest for modernity, and has been reintroduced as the principal dynamic element necessary for the spiritual and material advancement of these societes. The developments have made education a more contentious political issue than was the case in the past.

6.10. Religion as a Double-Edged Sword: The Canadian Experience (Rutan, G.F., Western Washington University, U.S.A.)

This paper presents research findings focusing upon the Canadian experience regarding the role and impact of organized religion and religious identity in the Canadian polity. Specifically, the research results portray and analyse the 'double-edged sword' effect examined by alle presenters in the panel, in this case in Canada. Religion, both organizationally and as a personal identity, has cut both ways in this political system. On the one hand it has served historically as a primary glue in the societies that constitute the nation and as a prime motivator in the development on the polity enhancing national identity among both French and English Canadians als well as among the New Canadians such as Sikhs and Hispanics. Religious organizations and behavior have thus been a positive force in building that elusive but highly desired goal of the Canadian Identity. The other edge of the sword also cuts deep in Canadian experience. Religious organizations and religious identities have served as major lines of social and thus of political cleavage in the past and the present. Moreso than in the United States experience Canadian politics has tended to reflect outright religious organizational loyalties and personal religious commitments. Since there is no ethic of the melting pot in Canadian society, and no establishment of a value of homogeneous national identity, the religious identity and organization remains a source of contention.

6.11. The Concepts of Politics: The Schizophrenia of the Political Education and the Political Reality (Szabó, M. Eotvos Lorand University, Hungary)

We have to reckon with some new features in the Hungarian politics of the past years. A new type of citizen activity is emerging which can be compared with the new social movements in the Western countries. The social base of these new social movements in Hungary is constituted mainly by young people, especially by students. There exists a network of the new social movements in Hungary, with some

thousand people involved in. Naturally, the political importance and the social significance of these movements in Hungary is much less conspicious than in the West, where the new social movements (especially those of West Germany) play a significant role. Since mostly young people, especially students and young intellectuals are involved in the movements, this has some importance in terms of the political socialization of future intellectuals who will be partly integrated into the power elite of the future. I try to analyze the role of these new movements in the political socialization of youth in Hungary. First, I put forward a brief general thesis on the role of social movements and subcultures in the political socialization of youth. Second, I describe the new movements of youth in Hungary, and I attempt to analyze them, compared with the alternative movements in the Western countries. My report is based on the research and discussions that took place in the Research Group on Political Socialization of the Institute of Social Sciences.

6.12. Political Learning in a Newly Independent Country: Papua New Guinea (Wormald, E., University of Papua New Guinea)

Papua New Guinea gained independence in 1975 and since then has maintained a western democratic system of government. Knowledge of such system amongst early voters was slight and the government hoped to improve the situation through education. They did not attempt indoctrination but allowed curriculum development through expatriate education officers who devised material modelled on international developments in social science.

The aim of social science teaching has, however, been unequivocally to produce social change through informed and responsible participation albeit in a context of respect for traditional culture.

A recent survey of High School students shows that interest in and knowledge about politics is high, though gender differences in the wish to be politically active show a continuation of the traditional subordinate position of women. The students, particularly the boys, feel competent to participate in politics, and they use their school learning to judge, unfavourably, current political practices. At age 16-17 they have learned the difference between the rhetoric and reality and it is not possible to assess whether they will resolve the dichotomy by working within or outside the current system of government.

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